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QUESTION PRESENTED
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) requires
that a settlement that binds class members must be
“fair, reasonable, and adequate.” In this case, the
Ninth Circuit upheld approval of a settlement that
disposed of absentee class members’ claims while
providing those class members no relief at all. Breaking with decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit held that
the settlement’s award of $6.5 million to establish a
new foundation controlled by the lead defendant and
class counsel was a fair and adequate remedy under
the trust-law doctrine of cy pres. The question presented is:
Whether, or in what circumstances, a cy pres
remedy that provides no direct relief to class members comports with the requirement of Rule 23(e)(2)
that a settlement that binds class members must be
“fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner Megan Marek was an objector in the
district court proceedings and appellant in the court
of appeals proceedings.
Respondents Sean Lane, Mohannaed Sheikha,
Sean Martin, Ali Sammour, Mohammaed Zidan, Sara
Karrow, Colby Henson, Denton Hunker, Firas
Sheikha, Hassen Sheikha, Linda Stewart, Tina Tran,
Matthew Smith, Erica Parnell, John Conway, Phillip
Huerta, Alicia Hunker, Megan Lynn Hancock, a
minor, by and through her parent Rebecca Holey,
Austin Muhs, Catherine Harris, Mario Herrera, and
Maryam Hosseiny were named plaintiffs in the
district court proceedings and appellees in the court
of appeals proceedings.
Respondents Facebook, Inc., Blockbuster, Inc.,
Fandango, Inc., Hotwire, Inc., STA Travel, Inc.,
Overstock.com, Inc., Zappos.com, Inc., and Gamefly,
Inc. were defendants in the district court proceedings
and appellees in the court of appeals proceedings.
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
A $9.5 million class action settlement that
awards absentee class members no relief at all – no
money, no guarantee that defendants will not injure
them in the exact same manner, not even coupons – is
not “fair, reasonable, and adequate” by any measure.
Yet the Ninth Circuit upheld such a settlement of
class members’ claims because class counsel and the
lead defendant agreed to use $6.5 million to establish
a new foundation, controlled by the defendant and
class counsel, that also does nothing to combat defendants’ alleged conduct or redress class members’
alleged injuries. (The bulk of the remainder of the
settlement proceeds, of course, went to class counsel
as fees.) That award, it held, was the “next best
distribution” of the settlement funds, short of providing actual payments to class members, and was
therefore justified by the cy pres doctrine, which
lower courts increasingly rely upon to direct class
action settlement proceeds to third parties selected by
attorneys or by the courts themselves.
For good reason, every other court of appeals to
consider class action settlements containing similarly
problematic cy pres awards has rejected them. See
generally Sylvia Hsieh, Class Action Settlements Face
Growing Scrutiny by Objectors, Courts, Lawyers
USA, Mar. 31, 2013 (noting circuit split). Those
courts’ decisions have recognized that cy pres awards
require special scrutiny because they can facilitate
tacit or explicit collusion between defendants, who
are eager to settle at the lowest price and with a
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minimum of fuss, and class counsel, who are seeking
to maximize their fees and may be willing to accommodate defendants’ desires in exchange for a “clear
sailing” agreement not to challenge the fee request.
They recognize that, in this way, cy pres awards
present a heightened risk of conflict between class
counsel and their putative clients, the members of the
class. They recognize that open-ended cy pres awards,
such as to entities without a track record of service or
those controlled by class counsel or defendants, may
provide little or no benefit to class members. And
above all else, they recognize that cy pres awards to
third parties are not appropriate when any reasonable opportunity remains to compensate class members directly for their injuries – always the first-best
use of settlement funds.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this
case brushed aside all such concerns. Addressing
them, it said, would be “an intrusion into the private
parties’ negotiations” and therefore “improper and
disruptive to the settlement process.” App. 14. It is
“unremarkable,” the court said, that a cy pres award
may actually serve to advance the defendant’s interests. App. 16. Even the availability of $2,500 in
statutory damages for some class members’ claims, it
said, does not render a settlement that directs every
last dollar to third parties or class counsel unfair in
any respect. App. 18-19. All that matters is that a cy
pres award “bears a substantial nexus to the interests
of the class members,” App. 14, which in this case the
court viewed broadly to encompass a campaign –
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again, controlled in part by defendants – to educate
the public about “user control” over Internet privacy,
when class members’ complaint was that the defendants had unlawfully denied them control over disclosure of their personal information.
If allowed to stand, the circuit split created by
the Ninth Circuit’s decision creates an enormous
incentive for forum-shopping by plaintiffs’ attorneys
seeking to sue and settle nationwide class actions like
this one. Bringing suit within the Ninth Circuit’s
footprint now guarantees that minor things like
compensating class members for their injuries, holding defendants liable to the extent the law allows,
and preventing defendants from injuring class members in the exact same manner will not stand in the
way of reaching a quick settlement to the mutual
benefit of defendants and class counsel, at the expense of class counsel’s putative clients. The Court
should grant certiorari to resolve this circuit conflict,
provide guidance to the lower courts on the use of cy
pres awards, and correct a serious abuse of the class
action mechanism that puts the interests of those it is
intended to benefit, class members, dead last.
------------------------------------------------------------------

OPINIONS BELOW
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is reported at 696
F.3d 811 and reproduced at App. 1. The opinions of
the United States District Court for the Northern
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District of California are unpublished and reproduced
at App. 48 and App. 63.
------------------------------------------------------------------

JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on September 20, 2012. A timely petition for rehearing en banc was denied on February 26, 2013. App.
75. Justice Kennedy extended the time in which to
file a petition for certiorari to and including July 26,
2013. See No. 12A1112. This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). As a class member who
objected to the settlement, Petitioner has standing to
appeal the final judgment. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536
U.S. 1 (2002).
------------------------------------------------------------------

RULE INVOLVED
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) provides,
with respect to a proposed settlement:
If the proposal would bind class members,
the court may approve it only after a hearing
and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Cy Pres Doctrine in Class Action Settlements
The cy pres doctrine originated in the law of
trusts and estates. The term is short for the French
“cy pres comme possible,” or “as near as possible.”
Historically, it referred to a court’s power, typically
under statute, to reform a trust or charitable gift that
has become impossible to administer according to its
terms. See generally Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian
& Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and
Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 625 (2010)
[hereinafter “Redish”]. For example, a 19th-century
court applied the doctrine to repurpose a trust that
had been created to support the abolition movement
to instead provide assistance to poor African Americans. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1867).
The application of the cy pres doctrine, or something resembling it, to class action settlements is a
more recent phenomenon. The “most adventuresome”
of the 1966 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was the addition of Rule 23(b)(3)’s provision for “class actions for damages designed to secure
judgments binding all class members save those who
affirmatively elected to be excluded.” Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614-15 (1997). That
provision empowered attorneys, armed with a few
representative plaintiffs, to file actions on behalf of
large and diffuse classes, aggregating members’
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paltry claims into litigation well worth an attorney’s
time. When these suits prevail, whether through
settlement or judgment, the proceeds typically flow
into a fund out of which are made disbursements to
individual class members.
It is a unique feature of opt-out class actions
that, unlike in other civil litigation, funds often
remain unclaimed, particularly where class members’
claims are small or the claims process is burdensome.
“Traditionally, such funds would revert to a defendant
– often an unpopular result because reversion of the
funds undermines the deterrent effect of the suit and
leaves the defendant largely with the benefit of his
illegal activity.” Redish at 631. In the 1970s, the cy
pres doctrine was proposed as a solution for this
“problem” of unclaimed settlement funds that could
achieve the “next best” result to compensation by
indirectly compensating absentee class members,
without undermining the deterrent effect of liability.
Id. at 631-34.
The use of cy pres awards in class actions quickly
moved beyond these modest origins to become an
integral component of many settlements. In these
cases, settlement agreements expressly provide for
awards to charities or foundations in addition to, or
in place of, funds earmarked for distribution to class
members. Used in this fashion, cy pres awards facilitate the filing, certification, and settlement of class
actions that would otherwise be infeasible to litigate
due to unmanageability or questionable merit. Redish
at 639-40; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818
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F.2d 179, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir.
1973)).
As critics have documented, these types of cy pres
awards “create the potential for conflicts of interest
by ensuring that class attorneys are able to reap
exorbitant fees regardless of whether the absent class
members are adequately compensated.” John Beisner,
Jessica Miller & Jordan Schwartz, Cy Pres: A Not So
Charitable Contribution to Class Action Practice 13
(2010) [hereinafter “Beisner”]. “Indeed, in many class
actions it is solely the use of cy pres that assures
distribution of a class settlement or award fund
sufficiently large to guarantee substantial attorneys’
fees and to make the entire class proceeding seemingly worthwhile.” Redish at 621. Despite these concerns, the use of cy pres awards in class action
settlements has grown quickly since the 1980s,
accelerating sharply over the past decade. Id. at 653.
The settlement at issue in the instant case is fairly
representative of this trend.
B. Facebook’s Beacon Program
Facebook operates the eponymous social networking website that millions of Americans (and
more abroad) use to share updates on their lives with
other users whom they have designated as “friends.”
Facebook, in turn, earns money by selling advertising
tailored to its members based on the information they
have disclosed to the service. Thanks to this quid pro
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quo – users trade personal information for access to
the service – Facebook has been at the center of
nearly every recent debate over technology’s impact
on personal privacy. If anything, the company has
courted controversy through frequent changes to its
privacy policies and aggressive efforts to extract more
information from its members to make its service
more valuable to both them and its advertisers.
To date, the most controversial of those efforts
was Facebook’s “Beacon” program, launched in November 2007. The idea of Beacon was to make every
Facebook member a personal pitchman for approximately forty companies engaged in online commerce
that had signed on to the program, including Blockbuster (movie rentals), Overstock.com (discount
merchandise), and Zappos.com (shoes and apparel).
Each company would send Facebook the details
whenever a logged-in Facebook member made a
purchase on its website. Facebook would then broadcast the details to that member’s friends – after all,
what could be more persuasive than a personal
endorsement from a trusted friend? Facebook, of
course, would collect revenue from these intimate
advertisements, while its members would have yet
another thing to share and discuss with their friends
on the service.
But Facebook’s members were less enthusiastic
about Beacon than its advertisers. Almost immediately, members complained about all kinds of inadvertent and sometimes embarrassing disclosures. Beacon
was indiscriminate, for example, in broadcasting
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news that a member had rented a blockbuster movie
versus racier fare. It spoiled gifts by broadcasting not
only that they had been purchased, but also whether
they had been bought on sale or from a discounter.
Thanks to Beacon, spouses learned of their significant others’ stinginess in spending on presents and
pricy self-indulgences, each of which probably caused
less friction than indulgent purchases apparently
intended for others, which Beacon equally revealed.
The cause of these unintended disclosures was
that, to encourage uptake, Facebook had made Beacon an opt-out program and then made it exceedingly
difficult for its members to opt out. Doing so “required
video game skills”: “The user would get a pop-up on
his screen asking whether he wanted to opt out, but
the pop-up would disappear in about ten seconds. Too
slow reading the pop-up or clicking the mouse, and all
a user’s ‘friends’ would know exactly what he had
bought.” App. 27-28. Accustomed to dismissing intrusive pop-ups almost automatically, many Facebook
members were unaware that their purchases would
be broadcast to their Facebook friends and never
knew that there was any way to opt out.
A few weeks after launching Beacon, Facebook
gave in to its members’ demands and made Beacon
opt-in. In this version of the program, purchases on
partner websites remained private unless a member
authorized Facebook to publicize them. Unsurprisingly, given all the negative publicity, Beacon usage
waned among members and advertisers. In September 2009, Facebook shuttered the program altogether,
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and Facebook’s CEO later declared the entire episode
a “mistake.”1
C. The District Court Approves a Settlement
That Provides No Relief to Class Members,
Only a Cy Pres Award
In August 2008, nineteen plaintiffs filed a putative class action in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California against Facebook and its Beacon advertising partners, alleging
violations of various federal and California privacy
and consumer protection statutes. Notably, one of
those statutes, the Video Privacy Protection Act –
enacted in response to the disclosure of Judge Robert
Bork’s video rental records – provides liquidated
damages of $2,500 for the disclosure of a consumer’s
video rental and sale records without his or her
“informed, written consent.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2008).
The complaint challenged only the earlier opt-out
version of Beacon, which had been curtailed nearly a
year before, and not the revised opt-in program.
Before the district court had a chance to rule on
Facebook’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims,
the parties entered into settlement negotiations. In
September 2009, they submitted a settlement agreement for the court’s approval. That agreement provided
1

Mark Zuckerberg, Our Commitment to the Facebook
Community, The Facebook Blog (Nov. 29, 2011), https://blog.
facebook.com/blog.php?post=10150378701937131.
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that Facebook would pay $9.5 million to a settlement
fund in exchange for a release of class members’
claims. At the same time, it dramatically expanded
the class to include Facebook members who might
have claims relating to the opt-out version of Beacon,
and provided for certification of this expanded class.
Facebook and its advertisers would thereby be immunized against all future claims regarding Beacon.
Other than “incentive payments” of a few thousand apiece to the named plaintiffs, class members
would receive no compensation at all. Instead, approximately $6.5 million of the settlement fund would
be used to establish a new grant-making organization
called the Digital Trust Foundation (“DTF”), with a
mission to “fund and sponsor programs designed to
educate users, regulators[,] and enterprises regarding
critical issues relating to protection of identity and
personal information online through user control, and
the protection of users from online threats.” App. 6.
This foundation would be run by a three-member
board of directors selected by Facebook and class
counsel. The initial board consisted of Facebook’s
chief lobbyist, a journalist who already served on
Facebook’s “Safety Advisory Board,” and a law professor.
Class counsel and Facebook agreed that attorney
fees would be drawn out of the settlement fund.
Facebook also agreed not to oppose an attorneys’ fee
claim of up to $3,166,667, or one-third of the fund.
App. 32. Ultimately, the district court awarded
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$2,364,973 in fees and expenses, twice the alleged
lodestar. App. 67.
The settlement also provided that Facebook
would end the moribund “Beacon” program, which
Facebook did months before the district court acted
on the proposed settlement. But, as class counsel
explained to the district court, Facebook refused to
sign off on any agreement “limiting their future
actions as a corporation,” and it would agree only to
terminate “the program launched by Facebook on
November 6, 2007 and all iterations thereof bearing
the ‘Beacon’ name.” App. 31-32. Facebook therefore
“remained free to do what it had done before, under a
different name.” App. 32.
The district court certified the class and approved
the settlement over the Petitioner’s objection that it
was not “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” as required
by Rule 23(e)(2), because it awarded class members
nothing while providing millions in dubious cy pres
“relief” and millions in attorneys’ fees. The court
agreed with class counsel that “the immediate benefits represented by the Settlement outweighed the
possibility – perhaps remote – of obtaining a better
result at trial.” App. 58. As for the availability of
liquidated damages for violation of the Video Privacy
Protection Act and other statutes, the court said only
that those claims “implicate factual issues that would
likely be vigorously disputed” and that the court was
not aware of “any cases in which plaintiffs have been
awarded multiple liquidated damages.” App. 55. On
that basis, the court concluded that the proposed cy
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pres award, establishment of the DTF, “provides more
meaningful relief to the Class” than would litigation
seeking statutory damages. App. 59.
The court also rejected objections that the settlement created a new organization, in a field that is
far from underserved, and placed its control in the
hands of the defendant and class counsel. The objectors, it said, had failed to make a “persuasive showing
that the Foundation will be a mere publicity tool for
Facebook, or in any meaningful sense under Facebook’s direct control.” App. 61. Regardless, such
arguments, it said, are “beyond the purview of the
Court” because parties are free to structure their own
settlements. App. 61.
D. A Split Panel of the Ninth Circuit Affirms
In affirming approval of the settlement, the
Ninth Circuit essentially adopted the district court’s
reasoning. To begin with, it denied that the cy pres
doctrine requires “settling parties [to] select a cy pres
recipient that the court or class members would find
ideal. On the contrary, such an intrusion into the
private parties’ negotiations would be improper and
disruptive to the settlement process.” App. 14. Instead, it explained, the district should approve a class
action settlement containing a cy pres award if “it
bears a substantial nexus to the interests of the class
members.” App. 14.
Here, it held, that requirement was satisfied
because the “distribution of settlement funds to
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entities that promote the causes of online privacy and
security will benefit absent class members and further the purposes of the privacy statutes that form
the basis for the class-plaintiffs’ lawsuit.” App. 15.
The panel majority rejected each of the objectors’
challenges to the adequacy of the settlement. First,
even while recognizing that some class members may
“have successful claims for $2,500 in statutory damages under the VPPA,” it reasoned that not all class
members had such claims and that the total settlement amount, $9.5 million, “was substantial in this
case” and therefore adequate “to the class as a
whole.” App. 21 (emphasis in original). In any case, it
held, paying out to class members the $6.5 million
that remained after fees and costs would be “ ‘burdensome’ and inefficient” because “each class member’s
recovery under a direct distribution would be de
minimis.” App. 23. It did not address that these
factors – the size of the fund, the number of class
members, the absence of subclasses – were components of the settlement itself.
Second, the panel majority saw no problem that
the recipient of settlement funds would be controlled,
in part, by the defendant. It was only understandable, the court explained, that Facebook “insisted on
preserving its role in the process of selecting the
organizations that would receive a share of that
substantial settlement fund. . . . so as to ensure that
the funds will not be used in a way that harms Facebook.” App. 16. For the district court to question
this aspect of the cy pres award would have been to
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“undermine” the parties’ negotiations and impermissible “second-guessing [of] the parties’ decision.” App.
16.
Third, the panel majority was also untroubled by
the settlement’s creation of a new organization with
no record of service that would at least suggest likely
benefit to absentee class members. It was enough, the
court said, that DTF has a mission statement, which
“tell[s] us exactly how funds will be used.” App. 17.
That mission, in turn, “bears a direct and substantial
nexus to the interests of absent class members.” App.
15. The court dismissed concerns that the organization might not carry out its stated mission as “unsupported speculation.” App. 17 n.4.
Finally, the panel majority rejected the objection
that the settlement’s provision for Beacon’s termination provided no benefit to class members as moot
because it was enough that “the $9.5 [sic] settlement
award substantially furthers the interests of the
class.” App. 24.
Having bulldozed every objection, the panel
majority affirmed the district court’s holding that a
settlement that provided no direct relief to class
members, only a questionable cy pres award, was
“fundamentally fair.” App. 25.
Judge Kleinfeld dissented, arguing that the
“settlement perverts the class action into a device for
depriving victims of remedies for wrongs, while
enriching both the wrongdoers and the lawyers
purporting to represent the class.” App. 27. The class
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action procedure, he explained, “has obvious attendant risks, because class counsel’s ‘clients’ are not
clients at all in the traditional sense; they do not hire
the lawyer, they do not agree on a fee with him, and
they do not control whether he settles their case.
They are in no position to prevent class counsel from
pursuing his own interests at their expense.” App. 34.
Cy pres awards only accentuate these risks
because they can facilitate the “pursuit of selfinterest rather than the class’s interests.” App. 44. In
particular:
A defendant may prefer a cy pres award to a
damages award, for the public relations benefit. And the larger the cy pres award, the
easier it is to justify a larger attorneys’ fees
award. The incentive for collusion may be
even greater where, as here, there is nothing
to stop Facebook and class counsel from
managing the charity to serve their interests
and pay salaries and consulting fees to persons they choose.
App. 45.
To prevent that result, Judge Kleinfeld explained, “the district court must ensure that a cy pres
award targets the plaintiff class.” App. 45. Here,
however, the district court failed to do so. There was
no “established record of performance by the charity
of acts beneficial to people in the wronged class.” App.
46. Indeed, “an ‘educational program’ amounting to
an advertising campaign for Facebook” would appear
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to satisfy DTF’s court-approved mission statement.
App. 46.
The only apparent benefit of the cy pres award in
this case, Judge Kleinfeld concluded, was to aid
Facebook and class counsel in facilitating a collusive
settlement between the lead defendant and class
counsel. As for any benefit to class members, the most
that could be said “is that in exchange for giving up
any claims they may have, the exposed Facebook
users get the satisfaction of contributing to a charity
to be funded by Facebook, partially controlled by
Facebook, and advised by a legal team consisting of
Facebook’s counsel and their own purported counsel
whom they did not hire and have never met.” App. 47.
The court subsequently denied panel rehearing,
over Judge Kleinfeld’s dissent, and denied rehearing
en banc, over the dissent of Judge Milan Smith,
joined by Chief Judge Kozinski, and Judges
O’Scannlain, Bybee, Bea, and Ikuta. App. 75. Judge
Smith protested that the cy pres award here failed to
“(1) be reasonably certain to benefit the class, and
(2) advance the objectives of the statutes relied upon
in bringing suit.” App. 76. Instead, under the panel
opinion’s approach, “an open-ended, one-sentence
mission statement is all it takes to earn cy pres
settlement approval.” App. 78. Worse still, that mission bore little relationship to the wrongs alleged by
the plaintiffs, because no amount of education on
privacy protection though “user control” could “teach
users how to protect themselves from Facebook’s
deliberate misconduct” in wrongfully disclosing
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personal information they had already shared with
Facebook. App. 80.
As a result, Judge Smith concluded, “this case
creates a significant loophole in our case law that will
confuse litigants and judges, while endorsing cy pres
settlements that in no way benefit class members.”
App. 76.
------------------------------------------------------------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This petition presents an ideal and timely opportunity for the Court to resolve a circuit split over the
use of cy pres awards in class action settlements and
provide much-needed guidance to the lower courts on
a recurring issue of substantial importance.
I.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Squarely
Conflicts with the Decisions of Other Circuits Limiting the Use of Cy Pres Awards

The Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with numerous decisions of the other circuits on the fundamental question of when it is “fair, reasonable, and
adequate” for a class action settlement to award
money not to class members but to third parties
unconnected to the litigation. This Court’s intervention is warranted to establish a nationwide standard
for the use of cy pres awards in class action settlements and thereby prevent counsel bringing nationwide class actions from shopping for forums that
provide their putative clients the weakest protections
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against collusive settlements facilitated by cy pres
awards.
A. The most fundamental conflict created by the
Ninth Circuit’s decision concerns whether a cy pres
distribution is appropriate and should be treated as
equivalent to direct monetary recovery in determining the fairness of a settlement, especially when the
defendant indirectly benefits from the cy pres award.
On this point, the Ninth Circuit is now in conflict
with decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.
1. The Third Circuit has emphasized that the
critical factor in evaluating a proposed settlement
containing a cy pres award is “whether the settlement
provides sufficient direct benefit to the class,” i.e.,
money compensation. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, the
district court must consider things like “the number
of individual awards compared to both the number of
claims and the estimated number of class members,
the size of the individual awards compared to claimants’ estimated damages, and the claims process used
to determine individual awards” before it may approve such a settlement. Id. at 174. The district court
has an obligation to “affirmatively seek out such
information.” Id. And having made such findings, the
district court must then determine whether the
“compensation going directly to class members” is
sufficient. Id. at 176.
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Cy pres awards, it explained, are no substitute
for direct compensation:
The private causes of action aggregated in
this class action – as in many others – were
created by Congress to allow plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages for their injuries. Cy pres distributions imperfectly serve
that purpose by substituting for that direct
compensation an indirect benefit that is at
best attenuated and at worse illusory. Cy
pres distributions also present a potential
conflict of interest between class counsel and
their clients because the inclusion of a cy
pres distribution may increase a settlement
fund, and with it attorneys’ fees, without increasing the direct benefit to the class.
Where a court fears counsel is conflicted, it
should subject the settlement to increased
scrutiny.
Id. at 173 (citations and footnote omitted).
Applying such scrutiny, the court vacated a class
action settlement that awarded only $3 million of a
$35 million settlement to a class of consumers who
alleged that they had paid inflated prices for baby
products due to unlawful collusion, with the remainder going to charity as a cy pres award. This distribution was due, in large part, to the structure of the
settlement, which required class members seeking more
than a $5 award to submit extensive documentation.
As a result, even class members who had suffered
overcharges of $50 or more, and would be entitled
by the Clayton Act to treble damages, had no real
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incentive to file claims. Id. at 176. “Class members
are not indifferent to whether funds are distributed to
them or to cy pres recipients, and class counsel should
not be either.” Id. at 178. Accordingly, the court
remanded the case for the district court to “determine
whether the class received sufficient direct benefit to
justify the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Id. at 176. Accord In re Pet Food Prods. Liab.
Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2010) (vacating
and remanding approval of a class action settlement
involving a cy pres award of excess funds because the
district court had no factual basis to determine
whether a cap on individual awards to class members
was reasonable based on class members’ likely recovery in litigation).2
By contrast, the settlement approval affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit makes no attempt to estimate the
value of class members’ claims before approving a cy
pres award that entirely depletes the settlement fund.
Instead, it simply accepts class counsel’s conclusion
that the settlement outweighs any possibility of
recovery through actual litigation, App. 58, and
assumes that class members would be entitled to only
“de minimis amounts,” App. 59, despite the availability
2

See also Pet Food Prods., 629 F.3d at 363 n.4 (Weis, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (citing the American Law Institute’s
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 3.07 (2010) (“ALI
Principles”) for the recommendation that “courts make numerous inquiries as to the viability of additional payments to the
class before consideration of the cy pres remedy”).
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of statutory liquidated damages for some class members that are far more than de minimis. In this way,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with the Third
Circuit’s requirement that district courts scrutinize
whether a settlement provides adequate direct compensation to class members before authorizing a cy
pres award of excess funds.
2. Similar to the Third Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit has held that a settlement that denies all
direct relief to class members, in favor of a cy pres
remedy, can be justified only if “careful scrutiny
indicated that the class had no realistic prospect of
sufficient success to enable an actual distribution to
the class members.” Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp.,
356 F.3d 781, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2004). “Because class
actions are rife with potential conflicts of interest
between class counsel and class members, district
judges presiding over such actions are expected to
give careful scrutiny to the terms of proposed settlements in order to make sure that class counsel are
behaving as honest fiduciaries for the class as a
whole.” Id. at 785 (citations omitted).
On that basis, the court reversed approval of a
settlement that relied on the doctrine of cy pres to
deny direct compensation to a subclass of mortgageholders whose bank had transmitted their financial
information to telemarketing companies selling
dubious financial services. Class counsel and defendants maintained that the settlement amount was too
little, and the subclass too large, for distributions to
its members. Its members, they argued, received a cy
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pres benefit from additional distributions to members
of a smaller subclass of mortgage-holders who had
actually purchased financial services from the telemarketers, because that remedy promoted deterrence
and carried out the purpose of the consumerprotection statutes underlying their claims.
The court met that argument with incredulity:
Would it be too cynical to speculate that
what may be going on here is that class
counsel wanted a settlement that would give
them a generous fee and Fleet wanted a settlement that would extinguish 1.4 million
claims against it at no cost to itself? The settlement that the district judge approved sold
these 1.4 million claimants down the river.
Only if they had no claim – more precisely no
claim large enough to justify a distribution to
them – did they lose nothing by the settlement, and the judge made no finding that
they had no such claim.
Id.
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s
approval of the settlement and remanded with instructions for it to estimate the value of the subclass’s
claims and reconsider the settlement’s fairness to
class members. Accord Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage
Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting, on
identical grounds, a revised settlement that also denied the subclass any direct relief, while awarding
funds to various charities).
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The settlement approval affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit certainly never found that class members
“had no claim,” even as it endorsed a settlement that
sold them down the river by extinguishing their
claims without any direct compensation, only a cy
pres award to a third party. To the contrary, both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit recognized that at
least some class members had potentially valuable
claims for statutory liquidated damages. App. 59, 21.
For that reason, the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts
with the Seventh Circuit’s in Mirfasihi.
3. Reasoning that “settlement-fund proceeds,
having been generated by the value of the class
members’ claims, belong solely to the class members,”
the Fifth Circuit has held that a cy pres award is
permissible “only if it is not possible” to compensate
class members directly. Klier v. Elf Autochem N. Am.,
Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 474-75 & nn.15, 16 (5th Cir. 2011).
It therefore rejected a cy pres award of excess funds
that had been allocated to one subclass, where members of another subclass had not been fully compensated for their injuries caused by exposure to arsenic
and other toxins. Id. at 478-79. Cy pres awards, it
said, are not permitted outside of the narrow circumstance where “it is not possible to put those funds to
their very best use: benefitting the class members
directly.” Id. at 475. Chief Judge Edith Jones concurred, arguing that cy pres awards should be strongly disfavored due to the inevitable conflicts of interest
and abuses associated with application of the doctrine
to class action settlements. Id. at 480-81.
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The Second Circuit has held essentially the same
as the Fifth, directing a district court to ensure that
class members “have been compensated for their
actual losses” before considering a cy pres award.
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d
423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007). See also In re Pharm. Indus.
Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 35 (1st
Cir. 2009) (endorsing a district court’s insistence that
a “settlement pay class members treble damages [as
provided by the underlying statute] before any money
is distributed through cy pres”).
The opinion below conflicts with Klier and Masters because it authorizes cy pres relief where providing additional direct compensation to at least some
class members was possible. In that respect, Klier
and Masters are also in conflict with the Third Circuit’s decision in Baby Products. 708 F.3d at 173-74.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s decision also creates a
circuit split regarding the required nexus between a
cy pres award and class members’ interests. On this
point, the Ninth Circuit is now in conflict with the
Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits.
The American Law Institute recommends that cy
pres awards, when otherwise appropriate, go to
“recipient[s] whose interests reasonably approximate
those being pursued by the class” and lists that as an
absolute requirement for settlements that deny class
members any direct compensation. ALI Principles
§ 3.07. In general, the courts of appeals have adopted
this as a baseline requirement for approval of cy pres
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awards. See In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices
Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing ALI
Principles and listing cases).
Applying that rule, the Eighth Circuit invalidated a cy pres award to the National Association for
Public Interest Law from excess funds remaining
after the settlement of antitrust claims against the
major airlines because the award was not tailored “to
the nature of the underlying lawsuit.” In re Airline
Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 683 (8th
Cir. 2002). The evidence and the district court’s
findings had shown that the airlines colluded to cap
commissions available to travel agents in Alaska,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, but
only agents in Alaska and Hawaii had been compensated. Id. Accordingly, “travel agencies in Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands were clearly the next best
recipients of the funds” that remained after the class
of Alaskan and Hawaiian agents had been fully
compensated, not a generic ‘public interest’ organization. Id.
Applying similar logic, the Seventh Circuit
invalidated a settlement agreement, in a nationwide
antitrust class action, featuring a cy pres distribution
to local law schools and directed the district court to
“consider to some degree a broader nationwide use of
its cy pres discretion.” Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 502 (7th Cir. 1989). Previously, the same court had disapproved of an earlier cy
pres award in the case that would have established a
private antitrust research foundation because “[t]here
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has already been voluminous research” on the subject
and so additional funding would not achieve the
class’s interests. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,
744 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1984).
The Second Circuit has adopted an even stricter
standard than the Seventh and Eighth, requiring
that a cy pres award actually advance class members’
interests. Eisen, 479 F.2d 1005, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Applying
that standard in a later case, it approved the establishment of a “class assistance foundation . . . to fund
projects and services that will benefit the entire
class,” consisting of persons who had been exposed to
Agent Orange. Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 184-85
(quotation marks omitted) (discussing Eisen). Key
was that the foundation’s benefits would flow to “the
class that claims injury from Agent Orange,” not
third parties. Id. at 185.
As described in Judge Smith’s dissent from
denial of rehearing en banc, the cy pres award in this
case does not at all “approximate” class members’
interests. See App. 77-78. The class complained that
Facebook and its advertising partners wrongfully
exposed members’ private information “in ways that
even educated users cannot anticipate, prevent, or
direct,” in violation of numerous statutory requirements. App. 79. By contrast, the cy pres recipient
proposes to fund public education on protecting
Internet privacy through “user control,” App. 6, which
is the very thing that Facebook and its partners
denied to class members, causing their injuries.
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While education on “user control” may further Facebook’s interests – certainly more so than research and
public awareness campaigns critical of privacy abuses
by service providers like Facebook – it does absolutely
nothing to advance anything like class members’
interests, and it certainly does not benefit them. For
that reason, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is in conflict
with ALI’s ‘approximate interest’ standard, conflicts
with decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
applying that standard, and falls far short of the
Second Circuit’s more rigorous ‘actual benefit’ standard.
C. Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s decision also
splits with the Second Circuit’s decision in Agent
Orange and First Circuit’s decision in Lupron regarding the duty of the district court to supervise the
administration of an open-ended cy pres award to
ensure that it achieves its intended purpose. Although approving of the idea of a grant-making “class
assistance program,” the Second Circuit held that the
“district court must . . . designate and supervise,
perhaps through a special master, the specific programs that will consume the settlement proceeds.”
818 F.2d at 185. The power to pick and choose remedies paid for with class members’ money, it explained,
belongs to the district court alone, and “there is no
principle of law authorizing such a broad delegation
of judicial authority to private parties.” Id. And there
could be “no assurance that [a] self-governing and
self-perpetuating board of directors . . . will possess
the independent, disinterested judgment required to
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allocate limited funds to benefit the class as a whole.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Instead, “only direct
judicial supervision can assure that the settlement
fund is expended for appropriate purposes.” Id. at
186. Accord Lupron, 677 F.3d at 38-39 (modifying cy
pres order to include annual audit requirement). But
see Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 181 (endorsing cy pres
distribution to third parties to be named later without new notice to the class and suggesting that class
members might intervene later to challenge improper
distributions).
By contrast, the settlement upheld by the Ninth
Circuit vests all control over the disbursement of
class members’ funds in a three-member board of
directors controlled by the defendant and class counsel. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this
board, which includes Facebook’s chief lobbyist, will
exercise “independent, disinterested judgment” or
that it will allocate funds “to benefit the class as a
whole” – indeed, its mission is unrelated to any class
members’ benefit. See App. 41-42.
Moreover, by permitting a cy pres award to a
Facebook-affiliated foundation, the Ninth Circuit
rejects the ALI Principles’ requirement that cy pres
recipients have no “significant prior affiliation with
the intended recipient that would raise substantial
questions about whether the award was made on the
merits.” ALI Principles § 3.07 cmt. (b); cf. Lupron, 677
F.3d at 36-37.
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II.

The Question Presented Is Important and
Frequently Recurring

Having long recognized that Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out
class actions are an “adventuresome” innovation
fraught with potential conflicts, e.g., Amchem, 521
U.S. at 614, 625-26, in recent terms the Court has
policed abuses of this procedural mechanism to skirt
the limitations of substantive law, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011),
and to undermine class members’ rights, e.g., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349
(2013). The availability of cy pres relief only accentuates these pathologies of the class-action procedure by
facilitating settlements that provide substantial
benefits to defendants and class counsel, often at the
expense of class members. Not only does this case
present the Court with an opportunity to resolve a
circuit split with nationwide implications, it would
also further the Court’s efforts to ensure that the
lower courts appropriately enforce the requirements
of Rule 23.
A. The unfettered use of cy pres awards has
been subject to substantial criticism by courts and
scholars alike. They have identified at least five
specific concerns regarding the type of cy pres award
upheld in this case.
1. As in this case, cy pres awards typically fail
to redress class members’ alleged injuries. Judge
Richard Posner stated the problem plainly: “There is
no indirect benefit to the class from the defendant’s
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giving the money to someone else.” Mirfasihi, 356
F.3d at 784. Yet settlements that do just that are
disturbingly routine. For example, in exchange for
their claims that major music labels engaged in
unlawful price-fixing, class members received coupons for discounts on further CD purchases, while all
settlement funds went to pay attorneys’ fees and to
make a cy pres award to the National Guild of Community Schools of the Arts to develop an arts-related
website. In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised
Price Antitrust Litig., No. 2:00MD1361-PH, 2005 WL
1923446, at *3 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2005). According to the
district court, this award actually benefitted class
members by promoting the “development of future
musical artists.” Id.
Even worse was a settlement resolving challenges to Google’s unauthorized disclosure of its users’
email contacts when it launched its “Buzz” social
network. Class members – some of whom had suffered disclosures that aided stalkers, jeopardized
confidential journalist sources, or hinted at affairs –
received no part of the $8.5 million settlement, while
class counsel received over $2 million and the remainder was divided among fourteen charities,
including the local YMCA and the Brookings Institution – and, by the sua sponte order of the district
court, a center at a university where the district court
judge taught as a visiting professor at its law school.3
3

While not present in this case, the problem of cy pres
being designated for local charities at the expense of a national
(Continued on following page)
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In re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., No. C 10-00672 JW,
2011 WL 7460099, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011);
Pamela A. MacLean, Competing for Leftovers, California Lawyer 15 (Sept. 2011). See also In re Netflix
Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL
1120801 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (relying on the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the instant case to justify a
$9 million settlement that denied class members any
monetary compensation, instead directing funds to
various charitable organizations); SEC v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (collecting numerous cases where cy pres
awards in class action settlements “stray[ed] far from
the ‘next best use’ ”).
If “funds generated through the aggregate prosecution of divisible claims are presumptively the
property of the class members,” ALI Principles § 3.07
cmt. (b) – something that would unquestionably be
the case had class members pursued individual
litigation under the same substantive law – it is at
class is also persistent. Compare Houck, 881 F.2d at 502 (rejecting cy pres designated for local law schools and remanding for
“broader nationwide use”), with, e.g., Perkins, infra, and In re
Easysaver Rewards Litig., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. 09-cv-2094
AJB (WVG), 2013 WL 435032 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) ($3 million
to local San Diego schools including alma mater of counsel for
both parties); see generally Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributions in Class Action Settlements, 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.
1014, 1030-31; Examination of Litigation Abuse: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Mar. 13, 2013) (written
testimony of Theodore H. Frank).
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the least troubling that some lower courts claim the
discretion to distribute that property to third parties
before class members have been compensated and,
more generally, to approve settlements structured so
as to stymie or preclude class members’ recovery.
2. Cy pres awards drive a wedge between the
interests of class members and their putative counsel.
The chief problem is that, when attorneys settle a
class action, they are negotiating both their own fees
and class recovery. But cy pres awards divorce attorneys’ fees (typically based on the total value of the
settlement) from their clients’ recovery, “ensuring
that class attorneys are able to reap exorbitant fees
regardless of whether the absent class members are
adequately compensated.” Beisner at 13. Thus, class
counsel are financially indifferent as to whether a
settlement is structured to compensate their clients
or direct settlement proceeds to third parties. In some
cases, class counsel may actually prefer a cy pres
award that advances their own interests, such as by
funding the development of future litigation, making
a sizable donation to counsel’s alma mater, or even
both. See, e.g., Ashley Roberts, Law School Gets $5.1
Million to Fund New Center, GW Hatchet, Dec. 3,
2007 (describing $5.1 million cy pres award to George
Washington University School of Law to create a
“Center for Competition Law”).
Arguably, “[b]y disincentivizing class attorneys
from vigorously pursuing individualized compensation for absent class members, cy pres threatens the
due process rights of those class members.” Redish at
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650 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45-46
(1940), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring adequacy of representation)).
3. Defendants, facing no resistance from class
counsel, use cy pres awards to structure settlements
to minimize costs or even benefit themselves. Such
awards create the illusion of relief that can “increase
the likelihood and absolute amount of attorneys’ fees
awarded without directly, or even indirectly, benefitting the plaintiff.” Redish at 661. Google and Facebook, for example, have directed cy pres awards in
privacy-breach cases to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit that “is often an ally of Google and
Facebook when it comes to staving off liability to
rights holders over user-generated infringing content”
and on other public policy issues. Roger Parloff,
Google and Facebook’s New Tactic in the Tech Wars,
CNNMoney, July 30, 2012; see also MacLean, supra,
at 15 (noting that Google Buzz settlement distributed
cy pres to six charities Google had given money to in
previous year). At the same time, those companies
have apparently vetoed awards to privacy-focused
nonprofits that they view as “too aggressively devoted
to combatting the wrongs that allegedly harmed the
class.” Parloff, supra.
Even if Google and Facebook ultimately receive
no direct benefit from these awards, they still are
able to take credit for their charity. See Molski v.
Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 954 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing
that “it seems somewhat distasteful to allow a corporation to fulfill its legal and equitable obligations
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through tax-deductible donations to third parties”);
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 867-68 (9th Cir.
2012) (noting that cy pres awards that overlap with
charitable gifts to which the defendant has already
committed are a “paper tiger,” in terms of deterrence).
In the instant case, Facebook stands to benefit by
funding a public education campaign that emphasizes
users’ ability to block disclosure of personal information, while commensurately minimizing the perceived risk of disclosure due to the actions of services
like Facebook. And that is a best-case scenario; as
Judge Kleinfeld explained, “For all we know [the
DTF] will fund nothing but an ‘educational program’
amounting to an advertising campaign for Facebook.”
App. 46. Nothing in the settlement forbids it.
4. The Second Circuit has expressed concern
that the availability of cy pres relief “would have
allowed plaintiffs to satisfy the manageability requirements of Rule 23 where they otherwise could
not.” Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 185. This, in turn,
“would have induced plaintiffs to pursue ‘doubtful’
class claims for ‘astronomical amounts’ and thereby
‘generate . . . leverage and pressure on defendants to
settle.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Eisen, 479
F.2d at 1019). In this way, cy pres incentivizes both
the bringing of ‘strike suits’ and their settlement on
terms mutually agreeable to class counsel and the
defendant. Cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 (stating that
the Rule 23 prerequisites “demand undiluted, even
heightened, attention in the settlement context.”).
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5. Finally, cy pres awards often create the
appearance or reality of judicial conflicts of interest.
New York University’s Samuel Issacharoff, Reporter
for ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, has described cy pres relief as “an invitation to
wild corruption of the judicial process.” Adam Liptak,
Doling Out Other People’s Money, N.Y. Times, Nov.
26, 2007. As the New York Times has documented,
charities are increasingly lobbying judges for a cut of
the proceeds in class action settlements. Id. And “[a]s
part of their effort to secure judicial approval of
proposed settlements, the parties often include a cy
pres award that benefits a charity with which the
judge or his or her family is affiliated.” Beisner at 13.
While greasing the wheels of justice, these tactics
create a substantial conflict between the interests of
the presiding judge and those of class members, who
may be better served by direct compensation or some
other mode of relief. See Klier, 658 F.3d at 482 (Jones,
C.J., concurring) (“[D]istrict courts should avoid the
legal complications that assuredly arise when judges
award surplus settlement funds to charities and civic
organizations.”); Bear, Stearns, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 415
(“[W]hile courts and the parties may act with the best
intentions, the specter of judges and outside entities
dealing in the distribution and solicitation of large
sums of money creates an appearance of impropriety.”). Compare Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034,
1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (criticizing cy pres distributions
to alma mater), with Perkins v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., No.
3:05-CV-100 (CDL), 2012 WL 2839788 (M.D. Ga. July

37
10, 2012) (approving $1.5 million cy pres award to the
presiding judge’s alma mater). Indeed, it is even
conceivable that “parties can effectively judge-shop by
selecting cy pres recipients that would force recusal.”
Ted Frank, Fraley v. Facebook update, Point of Law
(July 12, 2012) (noting district judge recusal for
unspecified reasons after parties proposed cy pres
settlement that named charitable beneficiaries affiliated with judge and her husband).
A more fundamental problem is that an openended cy pres doctrine is incompatible with the judicial role. “Federal judges are not generally equipped
to be charitable foundations: we are not accountable
to boards or members for funding decisions we make;
we are not accustomed to deciding whether certain
nonprofit entities are more ‘deserving’ of limited
funds than others; and we do not have the institutional resources and competencies to monitor that
‘grantees’ abide by the conditions we or the settlement agreements set.” In re Compact Disc Minimum
Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 236 F.R.D. 48, 53 (D.
Me. 2006). Yet those things are exactly what federal
judges are asked to do with increasing frequency.
B. Given the convenience of cy pres awards to
defendants and class counsel, it should not be surprising that their use in class action settlements is
growing at a rapid clip. A recent paper surveying cy
pres awards in federal court cases from 1974 through
2008 reports the following findings:
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First, the prevalence of class action cy pres
awards has increased steadily by decade
since the 1980s and has accelerated noticeably after 2000. Second, since 2000, the majority of class action cy pres awards are
associated with cases that were certified
solely for the purposes of settlement, over
one-third of class action cy pres awards are
associated with faux class actions, and approximately two-thirds of class action cy pres
awards are associated with either settlement
or faux class actions. Third, in a quarter of cy
pres class actions, the amount and recipient
of the cy pres award was determined ex ante,
or prior to giving absent class members the
opportunity to make claims on the fund.
Fourth, the average cy pres award was $5.8
million and accounted on average for 30.8%
of total compensatory damages. Finally, not
only do cy pres awards have the potential to
increase the total available fund and legitimize cases where the class might not otherwise be certified, but they can also increase
the likelihood and absolute amount of attorneys’ fees awarded without directly, or even
indirectly, benefiting the plaintiff.
Redish at 661.
The question presented by this petition is therefore both important and frequently recurring.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition.
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Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Andrew J. Kleinfeld, and
William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges. Opinion by
Judge Hug; Dissent by Judge Kleinfeld.
OPINION
HUG, Circuit Judge:
The question presented is whether the district court
abused its discretion in approving the parties’ $9.5
million settlement agreement as “fair, reasonable,
and adequate,” either because a Facebook employee
sits on the board of the organization distributing cy
pres funds or because the settlement amount was too
low. We hold that it did not.
I
Facebook is an online social network where members
develop personalized web profiles to interact and
share information with other members. The type of
information members share varies considerably, and
it can include news headlines, photographs, videos,
personal stories, and activity updates. Members
generally publish information they want to share to
their personal profile, and the information is thereby
broadcasted to the members’ online “friends” (i.e.,
other members in their online network).
In November of 2007, Facebook launched a new
program called “Beacon.” Facebook described the
purpose of the Beacon program as allowing its
members to share with friends information about
what they do elsewhere on the Internet. The
program operated by updating a member’s personal
profile to reflect certain actions the member had
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taken on websites belonging to companies that had
contracted with Facebook to participate in the
Beacon program. Thus, for example, if a member
rented a movie through the participating website
Blockbuster.com, Blockbuster would transmit
information about the rental to Facebook, and
Facebook in turn would broadcast that information
to everyone in the member’s online network by
publishing to his or her personal profile.
Although Facebook initially designed the Beacon
program to give members opportunities to prevent
the broadcast of any private information, it never
required members’ affirmative consent. As a result,
many members complained that Beacon was causing
publication of otherwise private information about
their outside web activities to their personal profiles
without their knowledge or approval. Facebook
responded to these complaints (and accompanying
negative media coverage) first by releasing a privacy
control intended to allow its members to opt out of
the Beacon program fully, and then ultimately by
discontinuing operation of the program altogether.
Unsatisfied with these responses, a group of
nineteen plaintiffs filed a putative class action in
federal district court against Facebook and a number
of other entities that operated websites participating
in the Beacon program. The class-action complaint
alleged that the defendants had violated various
state and federal privacy statutes.1 Each of the
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986); the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1986); the
1
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plaintiffs’ claims centered on the general allegation
that Beacon participants had violated Facebook
members’ privacy rights by gathering and publicly
disseminating information about their online
activities without permission. The plaintiffs sought
damages and a variety of equitable remedies for the
alleged privacy violations.
Facebook denied liability and filed a motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. Before the district
court ruled on Facebook’s motion, the parties elected
to attempt settling their case through private
mediation. The parties’ initial settlement talks
reached an impasse over whether Facebook should
terminate the Beacon program permanently, but
after two mediation sessions and several months of
negotiations, Facebook and the plaintiffs arrived at a
settlement agreement. In September of 2009,
plaintiff Sean Lane submitted the parties’ finalized
settlement agreement to the district court for
preliminary approval.
The terms of the settlement agreement provided that
Facebook would permanently terminate the Beacon
program and pay a total of $9.5 million in exchange
for a release of all the plaintiffs’ class claims. Of the
$9.5 million pay-out, approximately $3 million would
be used to pay attorneys’ fees, administrative costs,
and incentive payments to the class representatives.
Facebook would use the remaining $6.5 million or so
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988);
California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §
1750; and California’s Computer Crime Law, Cal. Pen. Code §
502.
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in settlement funds to set up a new charity
organization called the Digital Trust Foundation
(“DTF”). The stated purpose of DTF would be to
“fund and sponsor programs designed to educate
users, regulators[,] and enterprises regarding critical
issues relating to protection of identity and personal
information online through user control, and the
protection of users from online threats.” The parties’
respective counsel arrived at the decision to
distribute settlement funds through a new grantmaking organization, rather than simply give the
funds to an existing organization, at the suggestion
of
the
private
mediator
overseeing
their
negotiations. Neither Facebook’s nor the plaintiffs’
class counsel was comfortable with selecting in
advance any particular non-profit or non-profits to
receive the entirety of the settlement fund, so they
acceded to the mediator’s suggestion that Facebook
set up a new entity whose sole purpose was to
designate fund recipients consistent with DTF’s
mission to promote the interests of online privacy
and security.
According to DTF’s Articles of Incorporation, DTF
would be run by a three-member board of directors.
The initial three directors were Larry Magrid, a
member of the federal government’s Online Safety
and Technology Working Group and several other
online safety organizations; Chris Hoofnagle,
director of the Information Privacy Programs at the
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology and former
director for an office of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center; and most relevant here,
Timothy Sparapani, Facebook’s Director of Public
Policy and former counsel for the American Civil
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Liberties Union. The Articles of Incorporation
further provided that all of DTF’s funding decisions
had to be supported by at least two members of the
three-member board of directors but that the plan
for succession of directors required unanimous
approval. Finally, the Articles of Incorporation
provided that DTF would be strictly a grant-making
organization and could not engage in lobbying or
litigation.
The settlement agreement also provided for the
creation of a Board of Legal Advisors within DTF,
which would consist of counsel for both the plaintiff
class and Facebook. The purpose of the Board of
Legal Advisors would be to advise and monitor DTF
to ensure that it acted consistently with its mission
as articulated in the settlement agreement.
After a hearing, the district court certified the
plaintiff class for settlement purposes and
preliminarily approved the parties’ proposed
settlement. The settlement class consisted of all
Facebook members who had visited the website of a
Beacon participant that transmitted information
about the members’ activity to Facebook during the
relevant period. The district court ordered Facebook
to identify all class members and to send the class
notification of the settlement. Following that order,
Facebook identified 3,663,651 class members, to
whom it provided notice of the settlement in several
ways. The principal method was to send an e-mail to
the class members. Facebook also posted a notice of
the settlement in the “Updates” section of members’
personal Facebook accounts and published a
separate notice in the national edition of the
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newspaper USA Today. All forms of notice directed
class members to a website and toll-free number that
contained information about the settlement.
Also pursuant to the district court’s order, notice to
class members informed them of their right to opt
out of the lawsuit and settlement, and to file any
written comments or objections with the district
court before final approval. At the conclusion of the
notice period, 108 class members had opted out of
the settlement, and four had filed written objections.
The four class members who decided to remain in
the lawsuit but file objections to the settlement were
Ginger McCall, Megan Marek, Benjamin Trotter,
and Patricia Burleson (collectively “Objectors”).
Following a final settlement approval hearing in
which the district court heard from both the parties
and Objectors, the district court entered an order
certifying the settlement class and approving the
class settlement. The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ class action consistent with the settlement
agreement, and it maintained jurisdiction over
implementation of the settlement. The district court
also awarded class counsel attorneys’ fees in a
separate order. The amount of the attorneys’ fees
was calculated at $2,322,763 under the “lodestar”
method, meaning that the court multiplied the
number of hours class counsel reasonably spent on
the case by a reasonable hourly rate. That amount
was combined with costs for a total attorneys’ fees
award of $2,364,973, which represented less than
one-third of the full $9.5 million settlement amount.
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Objectors now appeal, contending that the district
court abused its discretion in approving the parties’
settlement. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

II
A district court’s approval of a class-action
settlement must be accompanied by a finding that
the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Appellate review of the district
court’s fairness determination is “extremely limited,”
and we will set aside that determination only upon a
“strong showing that the district court’s decision was
a clear abuse of discretion.” See Hanlon v. Chrysler
Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that district court should have broad
discretion because it “is exposed to the litigants, and
their strategies, positions and proof”) (internal
quotations omitted).
Both the district court and this court must evaluate
the fairness of a settlement as a whole, rather than
assessing its individual components. See id. at 1026.
As our precedents have made clear, the question
whether a settlement is fundamentally fair within
the meaning of Rule 23(e) is different from the
question whether the settlement is perfect in the
estimation of the reviewing court. See id. at 1027.
Although Rule 23 imposes strict procedural
requirements on the approval of a class settlement, a
district court’s only role in reviewing the substance
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of that settlement is to ensure that it is “fair,
adequate, and free from collusion.” See id.
A number of factors guide the district court in
making that determination, including:
the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation;
the risk of maintaining class action status
throughout the trial; the amount offered in
settlement; the extent of discovery completed and
the stage of the proceedings; the experience and
views of counsel; the presence of a governmental
participant; and the reaction of the class members to
the proposed settlement.

Id. at 1026 (hereinafter the “Hanlon factors”).
Additionally, when (as here) the settlement takes
place before formal class certification, settlement
approval requires a “higher standard of fairness.”
See id. The reason for more exacting review of class
settlements reached before formal class certification
is to ensure that class representatives and their
counsel do not secure a disproportionate benefit “at
the expense of the unnamed plaintiffs who class
counsel had a duty to represent.” See id. at 1027; see
also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 787 (3d Cir.
1995) (explaining that “[w]ith less information about
the class” at the early stage before formal class
certification, the court “cannot as effectively monitor
for collusion, individual settlements, buy-offs (where
some individuals use the class action device to
benefit themselves at the expense of absentees), and
other abuses”). Accordingly, when reviewing a
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district court’s approval of a class settlement reached
before formal class certification, we will not affirm if
it appears that the district court did not evaluate the
settlement sufficiently to account for the possibility
that class representatives and their counsel have
sacrificed the interests of absent class members for
their own benefit.
The settlement in this case provides for a cy pres
remedy. A cy pres remedy, sometimes called “fluid
recovery,” Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d
781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004), is a settlement structure
wherein class members receive an indirect benefit
(usually through defendant donations to a third
party) rather than a direct monetary payment. As
we recently recognized, the “cy pres doctrine allows a
court to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable
portions of a class action settlement fund to the ‘next
best’ class of beneficiaries.” Nachshin v. AOL, LLC,
663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011). For purposes of
the cy pres doctrine, a class-action settlement fund is
“non-distributable” when “the proof of individual
claims would be burdensome or distribution of
damages costly.” See id. at 1038 (quoting Six
Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d
1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990)). The district court’s
review of a class-action settlement that calls for a cy
pres remedy is not substantively different from that
of any other class-action settlement except that the
court should not find the settlement fair, adequate,
and reasonable unless the cy pres remedy
“account[s] for the nature of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit,
the objectives of the underlying statutes, and the
interests of the silent class members . . . .” Nachshin,
663 F.3d at 1036.
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III
Objectors challenge the district court’s conclusion
that the settlement in this case was “fair,
reasonable, and adequate” within the meaning of
Rule 23(e). The district court arrived at that
determination after considering Objectors’ written
statements and holding a fairness hearing where it
provided Objectors an opportunity to be heard. The
district court accompanied its fairness conclusion
with findings of fact, which included the court’s
application of the eight Hanlon factors to the parties’
settlement agreement.
Weighing those factors, the district court found that
the settlement should be approved on the basis of
the following: (1) reliance on novel legal theories and
unclear factual issues undermined the strength of
the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the complex nature of the
plaintiffs’ claims increased the risk and expense of
further litigation; (3) the class action could be
decertified at any time, which “generally weighs in
favor of approving a settlement”; (4) “[i]n light of
[the] litigation risks and in the context of settlement
claims involving infringment of consumers’ privacy
rights,” the class’s $9.5 million recovery was
“substantial” and “directed toward a purpose closely
related to Class Members’ interests in this
litigation”; (5) the parties had engaged in significant
investigation and informal discovery and research,
which in addition to information about Beacon that
was already publicly known enabled the plaintiff
class to “make an informed decision with respect to
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settlement, even though formal discovery” had not
yet been completed; (6) the settlement was “only
achieved after intense and protracted arm’s-length
negotiations conducted in good faith and free from
collusion,” and that class counsel had “reasonably
concluded that the immediate benefits represented
by the Settlement outweighed the possibility—
perhaps remote—of obtaining a better result at
trial”; (7) no government agencies voiced objections
or otherwise an-nounced actions arising out of
Facebook’s Beacon program; and (8) only four class
members objected and “slightly more than 100” from
a class of over 3.6 million opted out of the
settlement.
Objectors raise two issues in opposition to the
district court’s fairness findings. The first relates to
the settlement agreement’s provision for a cy pres
remedy. The second relates to the overall amount of
the settlement. Objectors also raise the ancillary
argument that notice to class members concerning
the settlement was inadequate. We address each of
these issues in turn.

1
Objectors’ first and strongest objection to the
settlement goes to the structure of DTF, the
organization that would distribute cy pres funds
under the settlement agreement. Objectors contend
that the presence of Tim Sparapani, Facebook’s
Director of Public Policy, on DTF’s board of directors
creates an unacceptable conflict of interest that will

-App. 14-

prevent DTF from acting in the interests of the class.
Citing Six Mexican Workers, Objectors claim that
the settling parties’ decision to disburse settlement
funds through an organization with such structural
conflicts does not provide the “next best distribution”
of those funds and thus is categorically an improper
use of the cy pres remedy.
We disagree. Objectors’ argument misunderstands
the cy pres doctrine and the principle from our case
law that a cy pres remedy must provide the “next
best distribution” absent a direct monetary payment
to absent class members. We do not require as part
of that doctrine that settling parties select a cy pres
recipient that the court or class members would find
ideal. On the contrary, such an intrusion into the
private parties’ negotiations would be improper and
disruptive to the settlement process. See Hanlon,
150 F.3d at 1027. The statement in Six Mexican
Workers and elsewhere in our case law that a cy
pres remedy must be the “next best distribution” of
settlement funds means only that a district court
should not approve a cy pres distribution unless it
bears a substantial nexus to the interests of the class
members—that, as we stated in Nachshin, the cy
pres remedy “must account for the nature of the
plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the objectives of the underlying
statutes, and the interests of the silent class
members. . . .” 663 F.3d at 1036.2

Our decision in Nachshin was not published at the time of
argument in this case, but the principles we announced there
were well established. We discuss Nachshin here because it
2
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The cy pres remedy in this case properly accounts for
the factors outlined in Nachshin. Objectors concede
that direct monetary payments to the class of
remaining settlement funds would be infeasible
given that each class member’s direct recovery would
be de minimis. Objectors also do not dispute that
DTF’s distribution of settlement funds to entities
that promote the causes of online privacy and
security will benefit absent class members and
further the purposes of the privacy statutes that
form the basis for the class-plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Unlike
the cy pres remedies we disapproved in Nachshin
and Six Mexican Workers, there is no issue in this
case about whether the connection between the cy
pres recipients and the absent class members is too
tenuous, either because the cy pres entities’ missions
are unrelated to the class’s interests or because their
geographic scope is too limited. See Six Mexican
Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308; Nachshin, 663 F.3d at
1040. The cy pres remedy the settling parties here
have devised bears a direct and substantial nexus to
the interests of absent class members and thus
properly provides for the “next best distribution” to
the class.
We find no substance in Objectors’ claim that the
presence of a Facebook employee on DTF’s board of
directors categorically precludes DTF from serving
as the entity that will distribute cy pres funds. As
the “offspring of compromise,” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at
1027, settlement agreements will necessarily reflect
provides a helpful summary of existing case law on the cy pres
doctrine.
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the interests of both parties to the settlement,
including those of the defendant. Defendants often
insist on certain concessions in exchange for
monetary payments or other demands plaintiffs
make, and defendants can certainly be expected to
structure a settlement in a way that does the least
harm to their interests. Here, in exchange for its
promise to pay the plaintiff class approximately $9.5
million, Facebook insisted on preserving its role in
the process of selecting the organizations that would
receive a share of that substantial settlement fund
by providing that one of its representatives would sit
on DTF’s initial board of directors, and the plaintiffs
readily agreed to this condition. That Facebook
retained and will use its say in how cy pres funds
will be distributed so as to ensure that the funds will
not be used in a way that harms Facebook is the
unremarkable result of the parties’ give-and-take
negotiations,3 and the district court properly
declined to undermine those negotiations by secondguessing the parties’ decision as part of its fairness
review over the settlement agreement.
We also reject Objectors’ claim that the settlement
agreement’s cy pres structure is impermissible
because the parties elected to create a new grantmaking entity, DTF, rather than give cy pres funds
Objectors argue that Facebook’s desire to protect its interest
in the cy pres distribution process is tantamount to Facebook
preserving its right to cause harm to the class. But Objectors’
argument assumes a false dichotomy. It is perfectly consistent
to say that DTF can be structured both to ensure Facebook’s
interests are not harmed and to promote the plaintiffs’ general
interests in the causes of online privacy and security.
3
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to an already-existing online privacy organization.
Again citing Six Mexican Workers, Objectors argue
that DTF has “no substantial record of service” and
is therefore inherently disfavored as a cy pres
recipient. But we have never held that cy pres funds
must go to extant charities in order to survive
fairness review, and a settlement agreement that
provides for the formation of a new grant-making
organization is not subject to a more stringent
fairness standard. The reason we found it relevant in
Six Mexican Workers that the charity organization
designated to receive cy pres funds had no
“substantial record of service” was that there was no
way of knowing whether the organization would use
the funds to the benefit of class members. See Six
Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308. Here, there is
no such worry, because the settlement agreement
and DTF’s Articles of Incorporation tell us exactly
how funds will be used—to “fund and sponsor
programs designed to educate users, regulators[,]
and enterprises regarding critical issues relating to
protection of identity and personal information
online through user control, and the protection of
users from online threats.”4 As we have explained,
that mission statement provides the requisite nexus
between the cy pres remedy and the interests
Objectors suggest that there is no assurance that DTF would
perform in accordance with the strictures of its charter
document, but that is unsupported speculation. There is no
reason to suppose that both the Board of Legal Advisors
(consisting of both the settling parties’ counsel) and the district
court (which retained jurisdiction over implementation of the
settlement) would abdicate their responsibility to ensure that
DTF performs according to the settlement agreement.
4
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furthered by the plaintiffs’ lawsuit consistent with
the principles we announced in Nachshin.
Objectors’ contention that the settling parties were
prohibited from creating DTF to disburse cy pres
funds is without merit, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in so concluding.

2
Objectors’ second argument on appeal is that the
district court did not sufficiently evaluate the
plaintiffs’ claims and compare the value of those
claims with the class’s $9.5 million recovery in the
settlement agreement. Objectors contend that the
value of the plaintiffs’ claims was in fact greater
than the $9.5 million the plaintiffs settled for, in
large part because some unidentified number of the
class members may have a claim under the Video
Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”). The VPPA
prohibits any “video tape service provider” from
disclosing “personally identifiable information” about
one of its consumers, and it provides for liquidated
damages in the amount of $2,500 for violation of its
provisions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b) and 2710(c)(2).
Objectors contend that the district court was not
sufficiently mindful of the possibility that the class’s
VPPA claims would yield a high recovery at trial,
and that the court would not have approved a
settlement of $9.5 million if it had paid the proper
attention to that possibility.
As an initial matter, we reject Objectors’ argument
insofar as it stands for the proposition that the
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district court was required to find a specific
monetary value corresponding to each of the plaintiff
class’s statutory claims and compare the value of
those claims to the proffered settlement award.
While a district court must of course assess the
plaintiffs’ claims in determining the strength of their
case relative to the risks of continued litigation, see
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026, it need not include in its
approval order a specific finding of fact as to the
potential recovery for each of the plaintiffs’ causes of
action. Not only would such a requirement be
onerous, it would often be impossible—statutory or
liquidated damages aside, the amount of damages a
given plaintiff (or class of plaintiffs) has suffered is a
question of fact that must be proved at trial. Even as
to statutory damages, questions of fact pertaining to
which class members have claims under the various
causes of action would affect the amount of recovery
at trial, thus making any prediction about that
recovery speculative and contingent.
Relatedly, the district court was not required to
include among its findings specific commentary on
each of the plaintiffs’ five statutory claims. All of the
plaintiffs’ claims arise under similar privacy
statutes, and as Facebook correctly points out, the
plaintiffs’ likelihood of success with regard to each of
those claims depends on the same basic legal
theories and factual issues. The district court acted
properly in evaluating the strength of the plaintiffs’
case in its entirety rather than on a claim-by-claim
basis. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
Moreover, the record contradicts Objectors’ general
argument that the district court did not
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meaningfully account for the potential value of the
plaintiffs’ claims, including any claims under the
VPPA. Both before and after the final settlement
approval hearing, the district court specifically
addressed the possibility that the presence of VPPA
claims among some class members might affect the
class settlement. In its order preliminarily approving
the settlement, the district court notified the parties
that “final approval will require a sufficient showing
that terms of the settlement are reasonable,
specifically in light of the claims under the VPPA,
and the apparent availability of statutory penalties
thereunder” (emphasis added). Following the district
court’s instructions, the parties did address the
VPPA issue in their briefing and arguments at the
final approval hearing. The district court also heard
from Objectors at that hearing, who again argued
that the settlement was too low in light of the
possibility of recovery under the VPPA.
The district court rejected that argument. It first
observed that Objectors had not “brought to the
Court’s attention any cases in which plaintiffs have
been awarded multiple liquidated damages,” which if
available would likely increase the class’s potential
recovery under the VPPA substantially (even if only
a small number of class members had VPPA claims).
The district court further noted that bringing the
VPPA claims to trial would involve significant risk
for the class given that the plaintiffs’ claims relied
on “novel legal theories” and “vigorously disputed”
factual issues concerning the Beacon program. And
although the district court did not mention it in its
approval order, the parties had presented evidence
to the court that Blockbuster, one of the only
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defendants that might qualify as a “video tape
service provider” and therefore be subject to liability
under the VPPA, was on the verge of bankruptcy,
likely making any substantial damages against it
annihilative. Based on its consideration of these
factors, the district court concluded that the “$9.5
million offered in settlement is substantial.”
That conclusion was not an abuse of the district
court’s broad discretion. A $9.5 million class recovery
would be substantial under most circumstances, and
we see nothing about this particular settlement that
undermines the district court’s conclusion that it
was substantial in this case. Objectors are no doubt
correct that the VPPA claims of some class members
might prove valuable if successful at trial, but that
does not cast doubt on the district court’s conclusion
as to the fairness and adequacy of the overall
settlement amount to the class as a whole. It is an
inherent feature of the class-action device that
individual class members will often claim differing
amounts of damages—that is why due process
requires that individual members of a class certified
under Rule 23(b)(3) be given an opportunity to opt
out of the settlement class to pursue their claims
separately, as were the class members in this case.
See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1024. But a class-action
settlement necessarily reflects the parties’ pre-trial
assessment as to the potential recovery of the entire
class, with all of its class members’ varying claims.
So even if some of the class members in this case
would have successful claims for $2,500 in statutory
damages under the VPPA, those individuals
represent, to use the candid phrasing of Objectors,
“only a fraction of the 3.6 million-person class.” Their
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presence does not in itself render the settlement
unfair or the $9.5 million recovery among all class
members too low.5
Objectors rely significantly on Molski v. Gleich, 318
F.3d 937, 949 (9th Cir. 2003) overruled on other
grounds by Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d
571 (9th Cir. 2010), in claiming that the cy pres
remedy here “did not adequately protect the
interests of the class,” but that case does not support
Objectors’ argument. Molski involved a settlement
that required the defendant to pay $195,000 in cy
pres funds in exchange for a release of all the
disability-related claims of a large class. 318 F.3d at
943-44. The district court in Molski had certified a
mandatory settlement class under Rule 23(b)(2)
without providing class members an opportunity to
opt out of the settlement. Id. at 947. In addition to
holding that the inability to opt out of the settlement
violated class members’ due process rights, we held
that “use of the cy pres award was inappropriate”
under the circumstances because the parties had not
made any showing that direct distribution of

Although a settlement is not categorically unfair for certain
class members simply because they might recover higher
damages than other class members were they to prosecute their
claims individually, significant variation in claimed damages
among class members is relevant to the Rule 23(b)(3)
“predominance”analysis during class certification. See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624-25, 117 S. Ct. 2231,
138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997). However, Objectors do not challenge
the district court’s class certification or its decision to include
individuals with VPPA claims in the settlement class, so we
express no opinion on that issue here.
5
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settlement funds to the class would be burdensome
or costly. Id. at 954-55. We also found “troubling”
that the class’s recovery under the settlement was so
low relative to the high number of potential class
members. See id.
Unlike the $195,000 cy pres fund in Molski, the
settlement in this case provides for a substantial
$9.5 million pay-out by Facebook for the benefit of
the class and thus does not present a situation in
which class representatives and counsel accepted
their respective fees as a quid pro quo for quietly
going away while the class receives virtually
nothing. See id. at 953-54. Also fundamentally
different is that class members here received notice
and were given the opportunity to opt out of the
settlement. And, most essentially, there is no dispute
that it would be “burdensome” and inefficient to pay
the $6.5 million in cy pres funds that remain after
costs directly to the class because each class
member’s recovery under a direct disbribution would
be de minimis. See id. at 955. These features
distinguish the present case from Molski and help to
account for why the latter was one of the “rare” cases
where we have intruded into the discretion of the
district court by setting aside its determination that
a settlement agreement is fundamentally fair. See
Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d. 938, 960-61 (9th Cir.
2003).
The record here convincingly establishes that the
district court accounted for the potential value of the
VPPA claims of some class members, and the district
court’s review of the circumstances surrounding the
settlement was sufficiently comprehensive to ensure
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that class representatives and their counsel did not
throw absent class members under the proverbial
bus to secure a disproportionate benefit for
themselves. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027. That
review was accordingly compliant with this circuit’s
requirement that the district court apply heightened
review to a class-action settlement reached before
formal certification. See id. at 1026. This is
particularly manifest in that the district court’s
detailed approval order included the specific factual
finding that the settlement agreement “was only
achieved after intense and protracted arm’s-length
negotiations conducted in good faith and free from
collusion.” Objectors have not made any showing, let
alone a “strong” one, that this or any of the district
court’s other findings was erroneous or amounted to
a “clear abuse of discretion.” See id. at 1027.
Finally, the litigants devote several pages of briefing
to a dispute over whether the settlement
agreement’s provision mandating the permanent
termination of the Beacon program provided any
meaningful relief to the plaintiff class. Specifically,
Objectors argue that Facebook’s promise to
terminate Beacon is “illusory” because the original
program was non-operational at the time of the
settlement agreement and thus already “effectively
terminated.” In light of our holding affirming the
district court’s conclusion that the $9.5 settlement
award substantially furthers the interests of the
class, Objectors’ argument that Facebook’s promise
to terminate Beacon provides no meaningful relief is
of little moment, and in any event we find that it is
without merit. Even assuming Objectors’ premise
that Beacon was already effectively terminated,
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absent a judicially-enforceable agreement, Facebook
would be free to revive the program whenever it
wanted. It is thus false to say that Facebook’s
promise never to do so was illusory.
We affirm the district court’s holding that the
settlement was fundamentally fair.

IV
Objectors argue additionally that the notice provided
to class members during the opt-out period was
insufficient because it did not describe the value of
the plaintiffs’ statutory claims and “did not
accurately describe what the class members would
receive in exchange for the release” of those claims.
Objectors argue in particular that the notice should
have included a description of the VPPA statute,
that it should have alerted class members that a
Facebook employee would be on the board of the
organization distributing cy pres funds, and that its
reference to Facebook’s promise to terminate Beacon
was misleading because Beacon was already
dormant.
We disagree. Notice provided pursuant to Rule 23(e)
must “generally describe[ ] the terms of the
settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with
adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come
forward and be heard.” Rodriguez v. West Publ’g
Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations omitted). That standard does not require
detailed analysis of the statutes or causes of action
forming the basis for the plaintiff class’s claims, and
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it does not require an estimate of the potential value
of those claims. See id. (notice need not include
“expected value of fully litigating the case”). Nor is
there any particular requirement that notice in a
class-action settlement involving a cy pres remedy
name the individuals sitting on the cy pres
recipient’s board of directors, even if one of those
individuals has some association with the
defendants in the case. Finally, for the same reasons
we reject Objectors’ argument that Facebook’s
promise to terminate Beacon was illusory, there was
nothing misleading about referencing that promise
in the class notice.
We agree with the district court that the notice in
this case adequately apprised class members of all
material elements of the settlement agreement and
therefore complied with the requirements of Rule
23(e).

V
Ultimately, we find little in Objectors’ opposition to
the
settlement
agreement
beyond
general
dissatisfaction
with
the
outcome.
That
dissatisfaction may very well be legitimate insofar as
Objectors would have acted differently had they
assumed the role of class representatives. But while
Objectors may vigorously disagree with the class
representatives’ decision not to hold out for more
than $9.5 million or insist on a particular recipient
of cy pres funds, that disagreement does not require
a reviewing court to undo the settling parties’
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private agreement. The district court properly
limited its substantive review of that agreement as
necessary to determine that it was “fair, adequate,
and free from collusion.” See id.
AFFIRMED.

KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. This settlement perverts the
class action into a device for depriving victims of
remedies for wrongs, while enriching both the
wrongdoers and the lawyers purporting to represent
the class.
A. The Facts.
1. “Beacon.”
Millions of people connect themselves to their
“friends” on Facebook. Some Facebook “friends” are
friends in the traditional sense, people we know and
like. Some are more in the nature of contacts, or
acquaintances, or people we think may want to see
what we post. For people who regularly use
Facebook to communicate, “friends” may merely be
their address book. The lead plaintiff in this case,
Sean Lane, had over 700 Facebook “friends.”
Facebook operates like a bulletin board, so that
“friends” can see whatever a user chooses to post and
not make private.
Facebook is “free,” furnished without a subscription
price. The company makes money by selling
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advertising. To make such sales more lucrative,
Facebook started a program called “Beacon” in
November 2007. Like an actual beacon, the program
shone light to make something easier to see: in this
case, a user’s “friends” could see whatever he had
bought from companies that paid Facebook to
participate in Beacon. Over forty companies signed
up for Beacon, including Blockbuster, a movie
retailer, Zappos, a shoe and clothing retailer, and
Overstock.com, a discounter. If a Facebook user
rented a movie from Blockbuster, for example,
Facebook told all his friends what movie he had
rented. Facebook told retailers, “Facebook Beacon
enables your brand or business to gain access to viral
distribution within Facebook. Stories of a user’s
engagement with your site . . . . will act as word-ofmouth promotion for your business and may be seen
by friends who are also likely to be interested in your
product.”
Many Facebook users strongly objected to losing the
privacy of their purchases. After all, people
ordinarily post on their Facebook page only what
they want to post, and they had not elected to tell all
their “friends” what they had just bought. Some
people buy things on the internet precisely because
they want more privacy than they would have at a
local store. Beacon took away their privacy, and
broadcast their purchases to people who users
wanted to remain in the dark.
Worse, Facebook made it very hard for users to avoid
these broadcasts. The user had to actively opt out.
And opting out required video game skills. The user
would get a pop-up on his screen asking whether he
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wanted to opt out, but the pop-up would disappear in
about ten seconds. Too slow reading the pop-up or
clicking the mouse, and all a user’s “friends” would
know exactly what he had bought. Since the pop-up
disappeared so quickly, someone looking at another
window, or answering the phone, or just not paying
attention, would likely not even be aware of the optout option before it disappeared.
Plaintiff Sean Lane alleges in the complaint that he
bought a ring from Overstock.com as a surprise for
his wife, but before he gave it to her, Facebook
ruined the surprise by spreading the news to his
over 700 “friends,” including many alumni in his
college class. Ginger McCall states that her video
rentals at Blockbuster were disclosed to all her
“friends.” Of the vast number of people whose
purchases were broadcast, no doubt some suffered
embarrassment, and some suffered damage to
employment, business, or personal relationships.
Some Blockbuster rentals doubtless included erotica,
some Overstock.com purchases probably included
gifts meant to look more expensive than they were,
and some Zappos purchases were probably more
extravagant than purchasers’ spouses were aware.
Someone who had told her college classmate that she
could not attend her wedding because she could not
afford the plane fare could lose a friend when
Facebook told her classmate that she’d bought $400
shoes. Mr. Lane complains that his wife asked him
about his ring purchase before he gave it to her,
ruining his Christmas gift to her. His wife might also
have been less impressed by the ring than he had
hoped, since she and all his other friends could click
a link and see that he had bought it cheaply — good
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for advertising Overstock.com, bad for advertising
Mr. Lane’s generosity.
Many users’ private purchases were exposed, and
over 50,000 complained. Within a few weeks (long
before this lawsuit was filed), Facebook eliminated
the opt-out Beacon program. Facebook changed it to
an opt-in program, so that users did not need to
maintain video game alertness to avoid disclosure to
all their friends. In the opt-in version of Beacon,
purchases made in private stayed private unless the
user expressly allowed Facebook to publicize them.
One of the objectors to the settlement, Ginger
McCall, says her movie rentals were disclosed even
after Beacon had supposedly changed to an opt-in,
and no findings have been made on whether the optin worked or was tricky to operate.
2. The Settlement.
This lawsuit was filed in August 2008, about eight
months after the opt-out version of Beacon had
ended. The complaint challenged only the opt-out
program that had lasted for a few weeks, not the optin version that had been in place since then. The
parties mediated and settled, all before any class
was certified. They agreed to end Beacon, both opt-in
as it then was, and opt-out as it had been originally.
The settlement agreement approved by the district
court (mistakenly, in my view) greatly changed the
class aspect of the case. First, the parties agreed to
certify the class for purposes of settlement. Second,
they agreed to expand it far beyond what the
complaint had sought. The complaint sought
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damages only for users affected during the few
weeks when they had to opt out, but the settlement
expanded the class to include everyone affected
during the much longer opt-in period. Since the
members of the class got no money from the
settlement, the effect of certification and expansion
was to bar any claims the expanded class might
have, not to provide more people with recompense.
In exchange for nothing, class members were barred
from suing Facebook, Blockbuster, Overstock.com, or
any of the other defendants for any claims arising
from or relating to Beacon, “including, without
limitation, arising from or related to data gathered
from Beacon.”
The majority states that Facebook promised never to
revive the Beacon program, but this is not quite
right. Facebook remained free to revive the program,
even the cancelled version under which the
subscriber had only a few seconds to opt out. The
only limitation the settlement imposed was that
Facebook had to call the Beacon program by some
other name. The agreement said that Facebook
would terminate “the Beacon Program,” and defined
“Beacon” to mean “the program launched by
Facebook on November 6, 2007 and all iterations
thereof bearing the ‘Beacon’ name” (emphasis
added). The district judge asked about this term, and
plaintiffs’ attorney expressly conceded that Facebook
was free to reinstitute the same program under a
different name. “[T]he problem was when you tried
to describe the functionality and you preclude
Facebook from using that functionality going
forward, it becomes truly problematic and becomes
impossible to reach an agreement because you’re
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limiting their ability to run their business. . . . At the
end of the day, we could not reach agreement with
defendants regarding limiting their future actions as
a corporation.” That was an on the record concession
that the injunction meant as little as it said, and
Facebook remained free to do what it had done
before, under a different name. The injunctive relief
the class received was no relief at all, not even a
restriction on future identical conduct.
Facebook users who had suffered damages from past
exposure of their purchases got no money, not a
nickel, from the defendants. Even those who had
rented videos, and were arguably entitled to
statutory damages of $2,500 for each disclosure, got
nothing.1 Class counsel, on the other had, got
millions. Plaintiffs’ lawyers and Facebook agreed
that Facebook would not object to attorneys’ fees up
to one third of what they called the “settlement
fund.” One third would be a fee of $3,166,667. The
fee would come out of the “settlement fund” and
would not be in addition to it, so Facebook had no
economic interest in reducing the amount. The fee

18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1), (c)(1)-(2) (“A video tape service
provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally
identifiable information concerning any consumer of such
provider shall be liable . . . . Any person aggrieved by any act of
a person in violation of this section may bring a civil action in a
United States district court. The court may award -- (A) actual
damages but not less than liquidated damage in an amount of
$2500; (B) punitive damages; (C) reasonable attorneys’ fees and
other litigation costs reasonably incurred; and (D) such other
preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be
appropriate.”).
1
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actually approved by the district court was
$2,322,763 plus costs of $42,210.58, 25% of the
“settlement fund.” That $2.3 million payment was
for getting their clients nothing and barring all the
claims of a vastly broadened class.
Not a cent of the remaining “settlement fund” money
would go to the Facebook users on whose behalf class
counsel purportedly settled. The only exceptions
were $10,000 to Mr. Lane, $5,000 each to two others,
and $1,000 each to the other 19 named plaintiffs,
amounting to $39,000 for the few people in the class
who presumably had personally agreed to have class
counsel represent them.
The remaining millions were to go to a new “privacy
foundation” that did not yet exist. The board of the
new foundation would be three directors to be agreed
upon by Facebook and class counsel, or if they
disagreed one chosen by each and the third chosen
by those two. Under the agreement, all three
directors could come from the Facebook advertising
and sales staff if class counsel and Facebook so
chose. The board of directors of this “privacy
foundation” was to be advised by Facebook’s own
lawyer and class counsel. The agreement provided
that the “privacy foundation” was to use its millions
to “fund projects and initiatives that promote the
cause of online privacy, safety, and security”
however its Facebook-friendly board chose.
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B. Analysis.
The class action rule2 was designed to facilitate
lawsuits where individuals’ or small groups’
judgments would not add up to enough money to
justify hiring lawyers, but judgments for large
numbers of similarly situated victims of misconduct
would. “The policy at the very core of the class action
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or
her rights. A class action solves this problem by
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries
into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor.”3
This procedural device has obvious attendant risks,
because class counsel’s “clients” are not clients at all
in the traditional sense; they do not hire the lawyer,
they do not agree on a fee with him, and they do not
control whether he settles their case. They are in no
position to prevent class counsel from pursuing his
own interests at their expense.4 The named
plaintiffs, those who actually have some chance of
directing their lawyers, typically get amounts of cash
without much relation to their individual damages,

2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S.
Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
3

See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 959-60 (9th Cir.
2003).
4
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so their incentives align more with class counsel
than with their fellow class members.
Defendant and class counsel, in any class action,
have incentives to collude in an agreement to bar
victims’ claims for little or no compensation to the
victims, in exchange for a big enough attorneys’ fee
to induce betrayal of the interests of the purported
“clients.” The defendant’s agreement not to oppose
some amount for the fee creates the same incentive
as a payment to a prizefighter to throw a fight. A
real client may refuse a settlement that is bad for
him but benefits his lawyer, but a large class of
unknown individuals lacks the knowledge or
authority to say no. It is hard to imagine a real client
saying to his lawyer, “I have no objection to the
defendant paying you a lot of money in exchange for
agreement to seek nothing for me.” “The absence of
individual clients controlling the litigation for their
own benefit creates opportunities for collusive
arrangements in which defendants can pay the
attorneys for the plaintiff class enough money to
induce them to settle the class action for too little
benefit to the class (or too much benefit to the
attorneys, if the claim is weak but the risks to the
defendants high).”5
Rule 23 protects against these risks much as the
courts have traditionally protected against similar
risks when attorneys represent children, estates of
deceased persons, and unknown persons, by
Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1327
(9th Cir. 1999).
5
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requiring judicial approval of settlements. Approval
and review, though, are a weak substitute for real
clients, because judges know little about the case
beyond what the lawyers tell them. That works
much better when the lawyers are on different sides
than when they are on the same side. Judges also
may face an incentive problem, where a heavy
docket cannot easily withstand the additional weight
of a huge lawsuit that does not settle. Objectors
provide a critically valuable service of providing
knowledge from a different point of view, but one
that is too often not used effectively. Our review
process is supposed to assure that settlement of a
class action, despite the risk of perverse incentives,
is “fair, reasonable, and adequate”6 and that notice is
given “in a reasonable manner”7 so that those bound
by the settlement have an opportunity to be heard.
In this case, the process has failed. The attorneys for
the class have obtained a judgment for millions of
dollars in fees. The defendant, Facebook, has
obtained a judgment that bars claims by millions of
people victimized by its conduct. So have the other
companies involved in Beacon. The victims, on the
other hand, have obtained nothing. Under the
settlement, Facebook even preserved the right to do
the same thing to them again.

6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).

7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1).
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1. The Settlement is Unfair, Unreasonable, and
Inadequate.
The factors for evaluating class action settlements8
are multifarious and indeterminate, but the cases
have become less tolerant of settlements not
beneficial to class members. We used to be extremely
deferential
when
district
courts
approved
settlements, as in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,9 the
1998 case on which the majority relies. We have in
the last few years become much less so, as in our
recent decisions In re Bluetooth,10 Nachshin v. AOL,
LLC,11 and Dennis v. Kellogg Co.12 We still exercise

See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th
Cir. 1998) (“Assessing a settlement proposal requires the
district court to balance a number of factors: the strength of the
plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely
duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class
action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in
settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of
the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the
presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.”) (citation omitted);
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco, 688
F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that such factors are “by
no means an exhaustive list of relevant considerations . . . . The
relative degree of importance to be attached to any particular
factor will depend upon and be dictated by the nature of the
claim(s) advanced, the type(s) of relief sought, and the unique
facts and circum-stances presented by each individual case.”).
8

9

Hanlon, 150 F.3d 1011.

In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935,
946 (9th Cir. 2011).
10

11

Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011).
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deferential review for abuse of discretion, but do so
in light of what we rejected in Bluetooth, Nachshin,
and Dennis. Review for abuse of discretion has never
meant that we will affirm whatever a district court
does.13
An extremely important qualification even in Hanlon
was a “higher standard of fairness”14 when
settlement is reached before a class is certified. In
this case, not only was settlement reached before
class certification, but the class certified for
settlement purposes was far broader than the one
sought when the case was filed. The Hanlon “higher
standard of fairness” matters because of “the
dangers of collusion between class counsel and the
defendant.”15 Bluetooth emphasizes the need for
greater scrutiny of precertification settlement on
behalf of a class.16 “Collusion may not always be
evident on the face of a settlement, and courts
therefore must be particularly vigilant not only for
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 687 F.3d 1149, 2012 WL 2870128 (9th
Cir. 2012).
12

Cf. Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d
1301, 1307-09 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that a district court’s use
of cy pres to distribute unclaimed settlement funds was an
abuse of discretion because it did not “adequately target the
plaintiff class and fail[ed] to provide adequate supervision over
distribution”).
13

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026; see also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d
937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Dukes
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010).
14

15

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.

16

In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d 935, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2011).
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explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs that
class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own selfinterests and that of certain class members to infect
the negotiations.”17
Collusion is far more likely before certification, and
exponentially higher if the class is expanded as part
of the settlement. Here is why. If a lawsuit is only on
behalf of named plaintiffs, damages are limited to
what they may properly receive, so if a case is
reasonably defensible, a defendant may make a
sound financial decision to defend. But if a vast class
is certified, then even a meritless case may require a
defendant to settle or bet all the money it has or can
borrow for attorneys’ fees, because even a very small
chance of a very large verdict is too much to risk.
Plaintiffs’ counsel want certification, to make the
damages enough to be worth the time and expense of
the litigation. Defense counsel oppose it, to keep the
risk down to a level where they can afford the risk of
litigation. Because certification of a class may turn
even a meritless plaintiff’s case into a bet-thecompany defendant’s case, defendants usually
vigorously oppose class certification, giving courts
the benefit of adversarial presentations.
Once the parties agree to settle, and agree to certify
a class, defendant’s interests are reversed. Plaintiffs’
counsel still have an interest in keeping a large class
certified, because the larger the class, the higher the
attorneys’ fees are likely to be. But if the defendant
will get a bar against claims, almost always a term
17

Id. at 947.
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of any settlement, the more people whose claims are
barred the better. The risk of having to pay out a
huge amount of money gets converted, by class
certification, into a certainty that vast numbers of
people will be unable to sue the defendant. So when
settling before class certification, and agreeing upon
class certification as part of the settlement, both
sides have the same incentive, to certify the class
and make it as vast and all-encompassing as
possible. It is a bonanza for the defendant if it can
bar the claims not only of everyone in the class
described in the complaint, but also of a much larger
class on whose behalf more and different claims
might have been asserted.
And that is just what happened here. The complaint
claims wrongdoing against and damages to Facebook
users during the few weeks of the opt-out period of
“Beacon.” The settlement bars claims of all the users
during that period and during the much longer optin period. When they settled, Facebook and class
counsel shared the same interest, as broad a class
certification as possible. Ideally, from both the point
of view of both sides’ interests (attorneys’ fees for one
side, protection from claims for the other) the class
would include everyone in the world, and bar all
claims of any kind from the beginning of time to the
present day. They came about as close to that as
they plausibly could.

Bluetooth
emphasizes
that
“clear
sailing”
agreements on attorneys’ fees are important warning
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signs of collusion.18 We have a version of a clear
sailing agreement here: Facebook’s agreement not to
oppose an attorneys’ fees claim of up to $3,166,667.
If, as here, the defendant agrees not to oppose an
attorneys’ fees claim, and defendants payout will be
the same no matter how high the fee is, then both
sides have an incentive to make the fee large enough
to induce plaintiffs’ counsel to sacrifice class
interests to plaintiffs’ attorneys’ interests. Bluetooth
holds that caution is especially necessary when, as
here, members of the class receive no money, but
class counsel receive a great deal of it.19 As the
amount of the fee to which no objection will be made
grows, especially if the fee will not affect the cost to
the defendant, it makes economic sense (though not
ethical sense) for plaintiffs’ counsel to throw the
fight for the money.
Strikingly, the settlement here goes even further
than coupon settlements, where class members get
only discounts if they buy again from the defendant
claimed to have wronged them before, while their
purported lawyers get huge amounts of money. Here
the Facebook users get nothing at all, not even
coupons. Every nickel of the remainder of the
$9,500,000 after class counsel’s cut, administrative
In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947 (“[A] ‘clear sailing’
arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees
separate and apart from class funds . . . carries the potential of
enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and
costs in exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on
behalf of the class.”) (citation and quotation omitted).
18

19

Id. at 947.
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costs, and incentive payments to the named
plaintiffs, goes not to the victims, but to an entity
partially controlled by Facebook and class counsel.
The new entity, dressed to look good in old law
French with its “cy pres” award and “non-profit”
status, can spend the money to “educate” people
about privacy on the internet, perhaps via some
instructional videos on how to use all the privacy
features available in Facebook.
Arguably, no harm would be done if all claims of
wrong-doing to Facebook users from the Beacon program were frivolous. If their claims were worthless,
then no wrong is done to them when those claims are
barred and $9.5 million gets transferred to some
lawyers they never met and a new entity not likely
to benefit them. But that would denigrate the claims
too far. There is reason to believe that Facebook
needed the shield its $9.5 million bought. Facebook
got customer complaints and bad publicity from the
opt-out Beacon program. The class had colorable
claims. Facebook had a good argument that it was
not itself a “video tape service provider” under the
federal statute entitling a customer to liquidated
damages of $2,500 for disclosure of what videotape
someone had rented from Blockbuster,20 but still had
a risk of some sort of vicarious, joint, or “civil
conspiracy” liability.21 If found liable, it was a deep
20

18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4), (c)(2).

In their complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that Facebook was
engaged in a civil conspiracy to violate the Video Privacy
Protection Act. See Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia
Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475, 869 P.2d 454, 457
21
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pocket target for the punitive damages for which the
statute expressly provides.22 And at least one federal
district court has taken an expansive view of who is
a “video tape service provider” prohibited from
making disclosures.23 The facts alleged in the
complaint stimulate a concern about the privacy of
people’s purchases on the internet and the use of
customer information by Facebook.
Tort law tends to evolve to make actionable conduct
widely seen as harmful, especially when the conduct
is willful, as it was here. The plaintiffs’ claims and
the risk of that evolution of tort law were worth
money to avoid, for Facebook. We cannot reasonably
say that a risk worth $9.5 million to Facebook to
avoid nevertheless had no value whatsoever to the
potential claimants whose claims presented that
risk. If Facebook users had no colorable claims, why
would Facebook have paid $9.5 million to bar them?
2. The Settlement does not Meet our Standards for
Cy Pres Awards.
Even if the $9.5 million number, the attorneys’ fees,
and the absence of any relief whatsoever to class
members all were “fair, reasonable and adequate,”
the new foundation would still not satisfy the
standards for cy pres awards. We held in Dennis v.
(Cal. 1994) (giving an overview of the California law of civil
conspiracy).
22

18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)(B).

Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1167 (W.D.
Wash., 2010).
23
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Kellogg Co.24 quoting Staton v. Boeing Co.,25 that cy
pres distributions present “a particular danger” that
“incentives favoring pursuit of self-interest rather
than the class’s interests in fact influenced the
outcome of negotiations.”26
Cy pres traditionally was a means by which, say, a
bequest to a charity no longer existing when a
testator died might be given instead to a similar
charity doing similar work. Thus a bequest to the
Boys’ Club might go to its replacement, the Boys’
and Girls’ Club. The doctrine has never meant
simply that money for harm to someone would be
given to someone else preferred by the defendant
and plaintiff’s attorney and perhaps by the court. We
cautioned in Nachshin v. AOL that “When selection
of cy pres beneficiaries is not tethered to the nature
of the lawsuit and the interests of the silent class
members, the selection process may answer to the
whims and self interests of the parties, their counsel,
or the court.”27
The rules of judicial ethics have in many forms for
over a hundred years prohibited judges from
endorsing charities, because of the risk that lawyers
and litigants will feel compelled to contribute to

Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 687 F.3d 1149, 2012 WL 2870128 (9th
Cir. 2012).
24

25

Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003).

Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 687 F.3d 1149, 2012 WL 2870128, at
*6.
26

27

Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011).
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them.28 Too liberal an approach to cy pres means
that a court may simply order, and not merely
encourage, someone subject to its jurisdiction to give
to a preferred charity. A defendant may prefer a cy
pres award to a damages award, for the public
relations benefit. And the larger the cy pres award,
the easier it is to justify a larger attorneys’ fees
award. The incentive for collusion may be even
greater where, as here, there is nothing to stop
Facebook and class counsel from managing the
charity to serve their interests and pay salaries and
consulting fees to persons they choose.

Nachshin holds that the district court must ensure
that a cy pres award targets the plaintiff class.29
Here it does not. Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona
Citrus Growers30 holds that a district court must
reject awards that provide “no reasonable certainty
that any member will be benefitted.”31 This one does
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, first adopted by
the ABA in 1924, states that a judge “should not solicit for
charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which .
. . might bring his personal interest into conflict with the
impartial performance of his official duties.”Henry S. Drinker,
Legal Ethics 274, 333 (1965). The current ABA Model Rules
have similar language. Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 3.7
(2007). Something akin to this was an issue in Nachshin, where
the judge’s husband sat on the board of a legal aid foundation
that was to receive a donation as part of the settlement.
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1041.
28

29

Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1039-40.

Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d
1301(9th Cir. 1990).
30

31

Id. at 1308.
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not. We require an established record of performance
by the charity of acts beneficial to people in the
wronged class.32 The cy pres award in this case goes
to a new entity with no past performance at all. For
all we know it will fund nothing but an “educational
program” amounting to an advertising campaign for
Facebook. That would appear to satisfy the articles
and bylaws, and Facebook, after all, together with
class counsel and their nominees, will run it.
3. Notice.
We review adequacy of notice de novo, not
deferentially.33 This is because notice is a matter of
due process of law.34 If a person owns a claim, it is
property, and the owner of the claim is
constitutionally entitled not to have it taken from
him except with reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Notice in this case was
inadequate, most obviously because the class was
not sufficiently informed that Facebook itself might
be in control of the money purportedly awarded on
account of wrongs it committed against class
members. The articles of incorporation and bylaws of
the purportedly charitable foundation were posted
online for the class to see only a week before the
deadline to opt out of the settlement. Those
documents said that “Tim Sparapani” would be on
32

Id.

33

Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1994).

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir.
1998).
34
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the three-person board, but failed to mention who he
was, Facebook’s own Director of Public Policy. Nor
did the notice say that Facebook’s counsel, Michael
Rhodes, would sit on the foundation’s legal advisory
board. Class members would have had to look
carefully at the settlement agreement and figure out
that Mr. Rhodes, the man designated as a legal
advisor on page twelve of the settlement agreement,
was the same man listed as Facebook’s attorney on
page five. Class members dependant on the notice
would have no idea that the money supposedly paid
for wrongs to them was to be spent by agents of the
purported wrongdoer.
Conclusion
The majority approves ratification of a class action
settlement in which class members get no
compensation at all. They do not get one cent. They
do not get even an injunction against Facebook doing
exactly the same thing to them again. Their
purported lawyers get millions of dollars. Facebook
gets a bar against any claims any of them might
make for breach of their privacy rights. The most we
could say for the cy pres award is that in exchange
for giving up any claims they may have, the exposed
Facebook users get the satisfaction of contributing to
a charity to be funded by Facebook, partially
controlled by Facebook, and advised by a legal team
consisting of Facebook’s counsel and their own
purported counsel whom they did not hire and have
never met.
Facebook deprived its users of their privacy. And
now they are deprived of a remedy.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
SAN JOSE DIVISION
SEAN LANE, et al., Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC.,
et al., Defendants.
No. C 08-3845 RS
March 17, 2010, Decided
March 17, 2010, Filed
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT
A hearing was held before this Court on February
26, 2010, pursuant to the Court’s Preliminary
Approval Order of October 23, 2009, upon a
Settlement Agreement, dated as of September 17,
2009 (the “Settlement Agreement”) in the abovecaptioned Litigation. Due notice of the hearing was
given in accordance with the Preliminary Approval
Order which was adequate and sufficient and in
accordance with the Court’s Preliminary Approval
Order. The represented parties appeared by their
attorneys of record, and an opportunity to be heard
was given to all other persons desiring to be heard as
provided in the notice. The Court has considered the
terms of the proposed Settlement as set forth in the
Settlement Agreement, and the submissions and
arguments with respect to it. Accordingly, the Court
makes following findings and orders thereon:
A. This Court has jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the Litigation pursuant to Title 28, United

-App. 49-

States Code, section 1332, and all acts within the
Litigation, and over all the parties to the Litigation,
and all members of the Settlement Class.
B. This Order incorporates herein and makes a part
hereof the Settlement Agreement, including the
Exhibits thereto. Unless otherwise provided herein,
the terms defined in the Settlement Agreement shall
have the same meanings for purposes of this Order.
C. Notice to the Settlement Class and other
potentially interested parties has been provided in
accordance with the notice requirements specified by
the Court in the Preliminary Approval Order.
Additionally, subsequent to preliminary approval,
the parties proposed amending the notice
requirements to specify that Class members would
be given notice by email to the Class members’ email
addresses on file with Facebook, in lieu of an
internal Facebook message in the ‘Updates’ Section.”
The Court declined to execute the parties’
stipulation, instead inquiring if it would be more
appropriate to utilize email notice in addition to that
specified in the Preliminary Approval Order, rather
than in lieu of it. Although the Preliminary Approval
Order was never expressly amended to require it,
notice was thereafter given by email in addition to
the other forms of notice. Such notice fully and
accurately informed the Settlement Class Members
of all material elements of the proposed Settlement
and of their opportunity to object to, comment
thereon, or exclude themselves from, the Settlement.
It provided Settlement Class Members adequate
instructions and a variety of means to obtain
additional information and represented the best
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notice practicable under the circumstances. The
notice was valid, due, and sufficient to all Settlement
Class Members and complied fully with the laws of
the of State of California, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the United States Constitution, due
process and other applicable laws. Notice was given
in a timely manner pursuant to the Order of this
Court on Preliminary Approval and provided
adequate time for Class Members to comment and
object. Further, this Court finds that adequate notice
was provided as required under the Class Action
Fairness Act.
D. One individual objector submitted an objection
complaining that the email notice he was given was
intercepted by his email program’s “spam filter.” The
objector asserted that this occurred despite the fact
that he has received other email from Facebook that
was not filtered. Although it is not entirely clear how
or why this may have occurred, the Court is satisfied
that the possibility that some Class members have
activated settings on their email accounts that might
filter the email notices does not undermine the
overall adequacy of the notice given. Indeed, even
the objector appears to have received actual notice
via email, albeit only because he checked the
contents of his spam filter, which not all Class
members may have done.
E. A full opportunity was afforded to the Settlement
Class Members to participate in, comment on, optout and/or object to the Settlement, notice and
claims procedure. A list of those members of the
Settlement Class who timely opted-out of the
Settlement and the Settlement Class and who
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therefore are not bound by the Settlement, the
provisions of the Settlement Agreement, this Order
and the Judgment to be entered by Clerk of Court,
hereon, has been submitted by the Claims
Administrator and is attached hereto as Exhibit A
and incorporated by reference herein. All other
members of the Settlement Class (as permanently
certified below) shall be subject to all of the
provisions of this Order.
F. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) lists four
conjunctive criteria that must be met to certify a
class action: numerosity, commonality of issues,
typicality of the representative plaintiffs’ claims, and
adequacy of representation. A class may only be
certified if the court is “satisfied, after a rigorous
analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied.” General Telephone Co. of Southwest
v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72
L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). Based on the record before the
Court, including all submissions in support of the
Settlement Agreement, objections, comments and
responses thereto, as well as the settlement set forth
in the Settlement Agreement, this Court finds that
the applicable requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 have been satisfied with respect to the
Settlement Class and the proposed Settlement.
Specifically, this Court finds that, with regard to the
proposed Settlement Class, Rule 23(a) is satisfied in
that:
1. The Settlement Class, as defined below, is so
numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. The undisputed record indicates that
there are over 3.6 million members of the class.
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2. There are questions of law and fact common to
members of the Settlement Class in that all the
allegations and claims in this matter arise from the
operation of Facebook’s Beacon program on thirdparty sites and its transmission of personal
information to Facebook.
3. The representative Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of
the claims of members of the Settlement Class.
Collectively, the representative Plaintiffs’ claims
implicate each of the defendants. More importantly,
all of the named Plaintiffs’ and Settlement Class
Members’ claims arise from the operation of the
Beacon program—a common course of conduct
resulting in the same or similar alleged injuries. See
In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM)
Antitrust Litig., 264 F.R.D. 603, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 110407, 2009 WL 4263524 *4 (N.D. Cal.)
(quoting Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497,
508 (9th Cir. 1992). Although some claims of some
Settlement Class Members arise from statutes
unique to the third-party Beacon Merchants with
whom
they
interacted,
the
more
salient
characteristic of the Class is the Beacon nexus and
the statutory claims, such as the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), common to all
Class Members. These reasonably coextensive claims
support typicality more than any disparities in
particular statutory damages militate against it. See
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975)
(“[t]he amount of damages is invariably an
individual question and does not defeat class action
treatment”); see also In re SRAM Antitrust Litig.,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110407, 2009 WL 4263524 *4
(citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011,
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1020 (9th Cir. 1998); (compare Video Privacy
Protection Act, Title 18, United States Code, section
2710(c)(2)(A) (liquidated damages of $ 2,500) and the
ECPA Wiretap Act, Title 18, United States Code,
section 2520(c)(2)(B) (statutory damages of
whichever is the greater of $ 100 a day for each day
of violation or $ 10,000)).
4.
Settlement
Class
Counsel
and
class
representatives have fairly and adequately protected
the interests of the Settlement Class. By Order
dated October 23, 2009, this Court, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g), appointed
Scott A. Kamber and David A. Stampley of
KamberLaw, LLC and Joseph H. Malley of the Law
Office of Joseph H. Malley, P.C., as Class Counsel for
the Settlement Class, providing the Settlement
Class with representation by nationally recognized
members of the class action bar and significant
experience in consumer privacy and technology
matters. Counsel’s efforts on behalf of the Class to
reach a settlement included protracted arms-length
negotiations for over a year as well as opposition to a
motion to intervene. The attorneys of KamberLaw
have made a showing that they possess experience
and expertise in the areas of consumer privacy and
technology matters and have professionally
represented the interests of the Class in this matter.
G. Because certification is for settlement purposes
only and not for litigation purposes, the Court need
not consider whether the case, if tried, would present
intractable manageability problems. Nonetheless,
the Court finds that on the record presented that
there would not be intractable manageability

-App. 54-

problems and, in fact, the class would be manageable
given its unitary nature and the high likelihood of
success in identifying Class Members.
With regard to the proposed Settlement Class, Rule
23(b)(3) is satisfied in that issues of law and fact
common to the Class predominate over those
affecting individual Class Members and that a class
action is the superior method to adjudicate these
claims.
H. The Court has held a hearing to consider the
fairness,
reasonableness
and
adequacy
of
Settlement, has been advised of all objections to and
comments regarding the Settlement, and has given
fair consideration to such objections and comments.
The Court has reviewed the papers submitted by the
parties and by all persons objecting to and
commenting on the Settlement and has heard the
arguments of those objectors to the Settlement
appearing at the fairness hearing.
I. The Settlement, as provided for in the Settlement
Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate and proper
and in the best interests of the Settlement Class. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court has considered
the record in its entirety, all objections and
comments submitted to the Court, and the
arguments of counsel for the parties and all other
persons seeking to comment on the proposed
Settlement.
The Court has considered a number of factors in its
evaluation of the Settlement, including: (1) the
strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense,
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complexity, and likely duration of further litigation;
(3) the risk of maintaining class action status
throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in
settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and
the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and
views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental
participant; and (8) the reaction of the class
members to the proposed settlement. Molski v.
Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003); Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
1. Regarding the strength of plaintiff’s case,
plaintiffs’ claims implicate factual issues that would
likely be vigorously disputed, such as the type and
sufficiency of notice Class Members received about
Beacon activity during specific time periods, the
nature of Class Members’ agreements with Facebook
and the extent to which Beacon’s transfer and
distribution of personal information was legally
unauthorized.
In addition, Plaintiffs’ claims raise novel legal
theories with little in the way of prior decisions to
assist in gauging the likelihood of success. For
example, regarding Blockbuster’s liability under the
VPPA, neither the parties nor objectors have
brought to the Court’s attention any cases in which
plaintiffs have been awarded multiple liquidated
damages. Facebook also has denied it is liable under
the VPPA definition of “video tape service provider.”
2. The contested facts and novelty of claims increase
the likelihood of risk, expense, complexity and
protracted duration of further litigation, which
would be significant even without such factors.
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Despite the brevity of the period of Beacon operation
at issue, the parties would have had to conduct
costly discovery of voluminous, not-easily-readable
Internet transaction logs of highly-trafficked
websites operated by numerous Defendants as well
as defendant Facebook’s software code for its Beacon
functions, and to engage in extensive preparations
for trial. This would have required significant time
and expense in reviewing discovery materials with
the assistance of experts and in preparing expert
witness reports and expert witnesses for deposition
and trial. Further, taking into consideration the
number of defendants involved, bringing this case to
trial would likely have been a long and costly
proposition, the outcome of which would have been
uncertain. This factor supports the fairness,
reasonableness and adequacy of the Settlement.
3. The risk that a class action may be decertified at
any time generally weighs in favor of approving a
settlement. Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563
F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, although there
has been no specific showing that maintaining class
action status throughout trial would be particularly
difficult or problematic, the general risks and
burdens on plaintiffs in doing so further support the
propriety of the settlement.
4. In light of these litigation risks and in the context
of settlements involving claims of infringement of
consumers’ privacy rights, the $ 9.5 million offered
in settlement is substantial and, further, is directed
toward a purpose closely related to Class Members’
interests in this litigation. The objectors do not
suggest otherwise, except to state that the “safety”

-App. 57-

element of the Privacy Foundation charter is
unrelated to the Class Members’ claims. However,
given the nexus of online privacy, safety and
security, particularly as those values relate to the
online threat landscape and the benefit of protecting
consumers’ identities and personal information
online from those threats, the Privacy Foundation as
constituted is sufficiently related to the claims raised
by Class Members.
5. The court has also considered the extent of
discovery completed and the stage of the
proceedings. The parties have engaged in significant
investigation, informal discovery and research, and
have documented these efforts to the court, both at
the Final Approval hearing as well as in the
declaration of Scott A. Kamber, Dkt. 107. These
efforts supplement the substantial information about
Beacon that is already publicly known, including
how it operates technically, the nature and timing of
modifications to its data collection, and how
Facebook interacted with the Facebook BeaconActivated Affiliates. Such information places the
Plaintiff Class in a position to make an informed
decision about settlement. Class Counsel established
that they acquired sufficient information to make an
informed decision with respect to settlement, even
though formal discovery is not complete. See In re
Mego Financial Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459
(9th Cir. 2000).
6. The next factor the Court has considered is the
experience and views of counsel. The Court
recognizes that the Settlement was only achieved
after
intense
and
protracted
arm’s-length
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negotiations conducted in good faith and free from
collusion, through the efforts of counsel with
recognized experience in complex litigation involving
technology and privacy issues such as those
presented in this case. Class Counsel demonstrated
an understanding of both the strengths and
weaknesses of this case. See declaration of Class
Counsel Scott A. Kamber, Dkt. 107. Based on the
facts of the case and Class Counsel’s experience in
these types of cases, Class Counsels’ reasonably
concluded that the immediate benefits represented
by the Settlement outweighed the possibility—
perhaps remote—of obtaining a better result at trial,
especially given the hurdles inherent in proving
liability on behalf of the Settlement Class and the
additional expense and delay inherent in any trial
and likely subsequent appeals. This factor supports
the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
Settlement.
7. Notice of the preliminary approval of this class
action was provided pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005. In addition, Class Counsel
explained at the Final Approval hearing that they
were contacted by, and spoke with, representatives
of the attorneys general of four states and responded
to their questions regarding the Settlement. No
government agencies voiced objections or comments
to the Court. In addition, the Settlement stands as
the product of the efforts of Class Counsel, inasmuch
as no attorneys general or federal regulatory
personnel have announced actions regarding the
Facebook Beacon issues present in this matter.
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8. Only four Class members have objected to the
substance of the settlement. The Court has also
received and considered comments from certain
privacy
organizations.
The
objectors
and
commentators have criticized the fact that, under
the Settlement, Class Members do not receive any
direct monetary compensation. However, the only
basis for compensation they have addressed at any
length is that which would proceed from statutory
damages awards. As discussed above, the
expectation of such recovery is speculative at best,
given the inherent and particular litigation risks the
Class would face in proceeding to trial. If only
moderate statutory damages were awarded, the
effect on the fund of incurring administrative costs
to distribute de minimis amounts per Class Member
leads to the conclusion that the certainty of the
Settlement,
as
constituted,
provides
more
meaningful relief to the Class.
Further, the objectors have suggested that the
claims in the Harris action were too valuable to be
released through this Settlement. The Harris
Plaintiffs, however, now join in the motion for
approval, having investigated and evaluated this
Settlement, and following the efforts of Class
Counsel in this matter to assist the Harris plaintiffs
in resolving their case against Blockbuster. As this
Court found in denying the Harris Plaintiffs’ motion
to intervene prior to Preliminary Approval,
“[H]aving pursued their own claims against
Blockbuster relating to these same operative events,
Proposed Intervenors are already uniquely equipped
to present informed analysis as to Blockbuster’s
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potential liability . . . .” Order Denying Motion for
Leave to Intervene, Dkt. 66.
Finally, the argument most strongly pressed by the
objectors and the commentators is that the Privacy
Foundation created by the Settlement is both
unnecessary and unduly subject to the influence and
control of Facebook. Although theoretical efficiencies
might arise from giving the settlement funds to an
existing organization rather than by creating a new
entity, that possibility does undermine the
conclusion that the Settlement is fair and adequate.
As to the independence of the Privacy Foundation,
the objectors’ arguments appear to rest on a premise
that no aspect of the organization’s structure, and no
future use of its funds, should in any way be
potentially consistent with Facebook’s own interests.
Settlements in litigation very often rest on the
participants’ abilities to find non-zero sum game
solutions. Thus, while it likely would be
inappropriate to apply settlement funds in a manner
that was solely or primarily for the benefit of the
defendant, there is no requirement that the funds be
used in a manner wholly antagonistic to the
defendant’s interests. In this context, the parties
have demonstrated that the structure of the Privacy
Foundation, and the individuals who will be involved
with it, are sufficient to ensure that the settlement
funds will be disbursed in a manner that furthers
the interests of the Class, and the public at large,
consistent with the interests pursued by plaintiffs in
this litigation.
Objectors have not shown there is any substantial
reason to doubt the independence of two of the three
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directors. The unanimity requirement for board
votes is applicable only to structural changes, and
not to funding decisions. While the director
associated with Facebook may reasonably be
expected to exercise his influence against the
Foundation taking any actions that would clearly
and directly harm Facebook, there has been no
persuasive showing that the Foundation will be a
mere publicity tool for Facebook, or in any
meaningful sense under Facebook’s direct control. To
the extent objectors are arguing that that
Foundation
could
be
structured
somewhat
differently, or that it would be even better for the
funds to go to some existing organization, such finetuning of the settlement reached by the parties is
beyond the purview of the Court. “Settlement is the
offspring of compromise; the question we address is
not whether the final product could be prettier,
smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate
and free from collusion.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027.
The fact that only a few Class Members object to the
proposed settlement further militates in favor of
approval. In re Mego, 213 F.3d at 459. In addition,
the fact that an overwhelming majority of the class
willingly approves a settlement and remains in the
class also indicates fairness. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at
1027. Here, given only four substantive objections
and slightly more than 100 opt-outs from over 3.6
million Class Members, this factor favors a finding of
fairness, reasonableness and adequacy.
J. The Court further finds that the Class
representatives are entitled to and shall receive
incentive awards for their efforts on behalf of the

-App. 62-

Class in this litigation and in obtaining this
Settlement. Class representative Sean Lane shall
receive an award of $ 10,000.00 due to the
significant time and effort that he devoted to seeking
the recovery obtained for the class, representatives
Mohannaed Sheikha and Sean Martin shall receive
an award of $ 5000.00 each for their significant time
and
efforts,
and
the
remaining
named
representatives shall receive $ 1,000.00 for their
efforts and time.
K. The Court will issue a further order with respect
to an award of attorney fees and costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 03/17/2010
/s/ Richard Seeborg
RICHARD SEEBORG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
SAN JOSE DIVISION
SEAN LANE, et al., Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC.,
et al., Defendants.
No. C 08-3845 RS
May 24, 2010, Decided
May 24, 2010, Filed
ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES
I. INTRODUCTION
The parties negotiated a settlement of this class
action, which has received final approval after notice
to the class. Remaining to be decided is the
application for attorney fees brought by plaintiffs’
counsel. The fee motion is unusual, because not only
does it seek fees for the efforts made by plaintiffs’
counsel in this action, it also seeks fees for work
done by plaintiffs’ counsel in Harris v. Blockbuster, a
proceeding in the Northern District of Texas arising
from the same events. The motion fails to establish
any legitimate grounds for awarding fees for efforts
undertaken by other attorneys in another case,
particularly given that those attorneys attempted to
derail the settlement of this action at the
preliminary approval stage, before later coming to
support it.
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Because the fee request is otherwise reasonable, the
motion will be granted, but with that portion of the
fee claim attributable to the Harris counsel excised.
II. DISCUSSION1
The parties’ settlement agreement provided that
plaintiffs’ counsel could apply for, and Facebook
would not oppose, attorney fees and costs of up to
one-third of the dollar amount being paid by
Facebook under the settlement—or roughly $3.17
million dollars. Counsel has in fact applied for an
award of fees in the amount of $2.828 million, plus
costs of $42,210.58.
Plaintiffs contend that California law governs the fee
award because their claims sounded in state law.
See Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co.
Inc., 342 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (“An award
of attorneys’ fees incurred in a suit based on state
substantive law is generally governed by state law.”);
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“[b]ecause Washington law governed the
claim, it also governs the award of fees.”). Here,
however, plaintiffs asserted both state and federal
claims, so it is not entirely clear that the fee award
should be evaluated under state law. As plaintiffs
acknowledge, however, the approach taken by
California courts is virtually identical to that taken
by the Ninth Circuit; under either jurisprudence

The factual background of this action has been described in
prior orders and will not be repeated here.
1
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the starting point is calculating a “lodestar,” by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent in
achieving the results obtained by a reasonable
hourly rate. Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d 1386,
1389 (9th Cir. 1995); Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.,
82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26 (2000).2
Plaintiffs seek a lodestar of $1,161,381.50,
representing approximately 2500 hours of work,
distributed among three law firms. Although the
motion originally was not supported by sufficient
detail regarding the tasks performed to permit an
analysis
of
its
reasonableness,
plaintiffs
subsequently submitted an additional declaration as
well as detailed time records, provided in camera.
Upon review of the record, the Court finds that the
total time and expenses incurred by plaintiffs’
counsel were reasonable in light of the work
undertaken and the results achieved. The Court has
further considered the geographic location and
experience of the attorneys who worked on this
matter and finds that the hourly rates charged by
counsel and reflected in the fee application are
reasonable. Accordingly, the proposed lodestar of
$1,161,381.50 will be adopted.
As noted above, the fee application proposes adding
to this lodestar an amount based on the efforts
undertaken by the Harris plaintiffs’ counsel in that
action. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that Harris
Plaintiffs assert that there is greater latitude in applying a
multiplier to the lodestar under state law than federal, but
they argue their request here is proper under either.
2
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counsel incurred a lodestar of approximately
$825,000, and they advocate allocating 30% of that
as a basis to increase the lodestar in this action to a
little over $1.4 million. Plaintiffs offer no authority
to support this novel suggestion. Even assuming that
Harris counsel’s efforts resulted in benefits to
persons who are class members here as well as in
that case, counsel must seek compensation for those
efforts in the action in which they took place. Indeed,
the only efforts Harris counsel undertook in this case
were directed at preventing preliminary approval of
the settlement. While Harris counsel may have
believed at the time that those efforts were in the
interests of the class, they cannot expect to be paid
from the settlement funds for opposing the
settlement, particularly since they ultimately
supported the settlement, with no material changes
in its terms.
The final issue is what multiplier, if any, should be
applied to the lodestar. With the inclusion of the
Harris counsel’s hours in the lodestar, plaintiffs
argue for a multiplier of 2, which they describe as
“reasonable and warranted.” Plaintiffs suggest,
however, that if the Court is not inclined to include
the Harris hours in the lodestar, then it should apply
a multiplier of 2.4, to reach the same total fee award.
The Court is satisfied that application of a multiplier
is warranted under the circumstances here. See In re
Washington Public Power Supply System Securities
Litigation, 19 F.3d 1291, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs’ suggestion, however, to apply a 2.4
multiplier as a means to ensure the same result as if
the Harris hours were included in the lodestar is
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disturbingly cynical. Having concluded that those
hours should not be compensated in this action as
part of the lodestar, the Court will not provide
compensation for those hours by labeling it as
something else. Accordingly, a multiplier of 2 will be
applied.
III. CONCLUSION
The motion for an award of attorney fees and costs is
granted in part. Plaintiffs’ counsel shall recover from
the settlement funds attorney fees of $2,322,763.00
and costs of $42,210.58, for a total award of
$2,364,973.58.
Dated: May 24, 2010
/s/ Richard Seeborg
RICHARD SEEBORG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
SAN JOSE DIVISION
SEAN LANE, et al., Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC.,
et al., Defendants.
No. C 08-3845 RS
May 27, 2010, Decided
May 27, 2010, Filed
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Pursuant to this Court’s Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order Approving
Settlement of March 17, 2010 (the “Final Approval
Order”) and Order re Attorneys’ Fees of May 24,
2010 (the “Attorneys’ Fees Order”), which are
incorporated herin by reference,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED THAT:
A. This Judgment incorporates by reference the
definitions of the Settlement Agreement dated as of
September 17, 2009 (the “Settlement Agreement”),
and all defined terms used herein shall have the
same meanings as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.
B. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),
there is no just reason for delay and final judgment
is entered as to all defendants in the Litigation.
C. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
this Court hereby affirms its findings and
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conclusions, set forth in the Preliminary Approval
and Notice Order as well as its Final Approval Order
that, for purposes of the Settlement Agreement and
Settlement, this Class meets the prerequisites for
maintenance of a class action under Rule 23. The
Court hereby makes final its previously conditional
certification of the Class.
D. The Court finds that, during the course of the
Litigation, the Parties and their respective counsel
at all times complied with the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and that the
Settlement Agreement is the product of good-faith
negotiations.
E. This Court, having approved the Settlement,
having found the Settlement to be fair, reasonable,
and adequate in all respects for the Class pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), having
found the Settlement Agreement and the Settlement
to be fair, reasonable and adequate as to the Parties,
and granting final approval of the Settlement
Agreement and the Settlement in all respects,
hereby directs the Parties to peform the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.
F. As to all Protected Persons, this Court hereby
dismisses the Litigation in its entirety with
prejudice and without costs (except as otherwise
expressly provided in the Settlement Agreement and
by other order of the Court).
G.Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Judgment
does not dismiss any of the individual claims
asserted by any persons or entities, identified in
Exhibit A to the Court’s Final Approval Order (Dkt.
No. 123, p. 12), who validly and timely requested
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exclusion from the Settlement Class as provided for
in the Preliminary Approval and Notice Order, and
persons so identified shall not share in the benefits
of the Settlement. In addition, this Final Judgment
does not affect their legal rights to pursue any
claims they may have against Defendants. With
regard to all other members of the Class, such Class
Members are hereinafter barred and permanently
enjoined from prosecuting further the Released
Claims against Protected Persons.
H. As set forth in paragraphs 5.1-5.4 of the
Settlement Agreement, upon the Effective Date, the
Representative Plaintiffs and each and every one of
the Class Members shall be deemed to have and by
operation of this Judgment shall have fully, finally,
and forever released, relinquished, and discharged
the Protected Persons from all Released Claims.
I. Neither Class Counsel’s application for attorneys’
fees and reimbursement of expenses nor any order
entered by this Court thereon, including the
Attorneys’ Fees Order, shall in any way disturb or
affect this Judgment, and all such matters shall be
construed
separately
from
this
Judgment.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of the Litgation,
there shall be no claims or awards of any costs,
attorneys’ fees, or expense to be paid by Class
Counsel or from the Settlement Fund except as
expressly set forth in the orders of this Court.
J. Neither the Settlement Agreement nor the
Settlement nor any act performed or document
executed pursuant to or in furtherance of the
Settlement Agreement or the Settlement: (i) is or
may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission
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of, or evidence of, the validity of any Released
Claims, of any wrongdoing or liability of Protected
Persons, or a finding or evidence that any claims
that either were brought or could have been brought
in the Litigation are appropriate for class treatment
or that any requirement for class certification is or
could otherwise be satisfied; or (ii) is or may be
deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or
evidence of, any fault or omission of Protected
Persons in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding in any court, administrative agency, or
other tribunal.
K. Protected Persons may file this Judgment and/or
the Settlement Agreement from this action in any
other action that may be brought against them in
order to support a defense or counterclaim based on
principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, release,
good-faith settlement, judgment bar or reduction, or
any theory of claim preclusion or issue preclusion or
similar defense or counterclaim. Protected Persons
may rely on this Judgment and/or the Settlement
Agreement from this action to seek a dismissal of
any claim brought against Facebook or any of the
Protected Persons, in any court whatsoever, which
derives from the Released Claims.
L. Without affecting the finality of this Judgment in
any way, this Court hereby retains continuing
jurisdiction over (i) implementation of the
Settlement; (ii) distribution or disposition of the
Settlement Fund; (iii) further proceedings, if
necessary, on applications for attorneys’ fees,
expenses, and costs in connection with the Litigation
and the Settlement; and (d) the parties for the

-App. 72-

purpose of construing, enforcing and administering
the Settlement Agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: May 27, 2010
/s/ Richard Seeborg
RICHARD SEEBORG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Argued October 12, 2011

Filed February 26, 2013

No. 10-16380, No. 10-16398
SEAN LANE; MOHANNAED SHEIKHA; SEAN
MARTIN; ALI SAMMOUR; MOHAMMAED ZIDAN;
SARA KARROW; COLBY HENSON; DENTON
HUNKER; FIRAS SHEIKHA; HASSEN SHEIKHA;
LINDA STEWART; TINA TRAN; MATTHEW
SMITH; ERICA PARNELL; JOHN CONWAY;
PHILLIP HUERTA; ALICIA HUNKER; MEGAN
LYNN HANCOCK, a minor, by and through her
parent
Rebecca
Holey;
AUSTIN
MUHS;
CATHERINE
HARRIS;
MARIO
HERRERA;
MARYAM HOSSEINY, individually and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FACEBOOK, INC., a
Delaware corporation; BLOCKBUSTER, INC., a
Delaware corporation; FANDANGO, INC., a
Delaware corporation; HOTWIRE, INC., a Delaware
corporation; STA TRAVEL, INC., a Delaware
corporation; OVERSTOCK.COM, INC., a Delaware
corporation; ZAPPOS.COM, INC., a Delaware
corporation;
GAMEFLY,
INC.,
a
Delaware
corporation,
Defendants-Appellees,
GINGER
MCCALL, Class Member, Objector-Appellant. SEAN
LANE; MOHANNAED SHEIKHA; SEAN MARTIN,
individually, and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated; ALI SAMMOUR;
MOHAMMAED ZIDAN; SARA KARROW; COLBY
HENSON; DENTON HUNKER; FIRAS SHEIKHA;
HASSEN SHEIKHA; LINDA STEWART; TINA
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TRAN; MATTHEW SMITH; ERICA PARNELL;
JOHN CONWAY; PHILLIP HUERTA; ALICIA
HUNKER; MEGAN LYNN HANCOCK, a minor, by
and through her parent Rebecca Holey; AUSTIN
MUHS; CATHERINE HARRIS; MARIO HERRERA;
MARYAM HOSSEINY, individually and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FACEBOOK, INC., a
Delaware corporation; BLOCKBUSTER, INC., a
Delaware corporation; HOTWIRE, INC., a Delaware
corporation; FANDANGO, INC., a Delaware
corporation; STA TRAVEL, INC., a Delaware
corporation; OVERSTOCK.COM, INC., a Delaware
corporation; ZAPPOS.COM, INC., a Delaware
corporation;
GAMEFLY,
INC.,
a
Delaware
corporation,
Defendants-Appellees,
MEGAN
MAREK; BENJAMIN TROTTER, Class Members,
Objectors-Appellants.

Michael H. Page, Public Citizen Litigation Group,
Washington, D.C.; Steven F. Helfand, Helfand Law
Offices, San Francisco, California, for the objectorsappellants.
Scott A. Kamber, Kamber Law, LLC, New York, New
York, for the plaintiffs-appellees.
Michael G. Rhodes, Cooley LLP, San Francisco,
California, for the defendants-appellees.
JUDGES: Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Andrew J.
Kleinfeld, and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.
Order; Dissent to Order by Judge Milan D. Smith,
Jr..
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OPINION
ORDER
Judges Hug and W. Fletcher have voted to deny
appellants’ petitions for rehearing. Judge Kleinfeld
has voted to grant the petitions for rehearing. Judge
W. Fletcher has voted to deny the petitions for
rehearing en banc and Judge Hug has so
recommended. Judge Kleinfeld would grant the
petitions for rehearing en banc.
The full court was advised of the petitions for
rehearing en banc. A judge of the court requested a
vote on en banc rehearing. The matter failed to
receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused
active judges in favor of en banc consideration. Fed.
R. App. P. 35.
The petitions for rehearing and the petitions for
rehearing en banc are DENIED. Judge M. Smith’s
dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing is filed
concurrently herewith.

DISSENT
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, with whom KOZINSKI,
Chief Judge, and O'SCANNLAIN, BYBEE, BEA, and
IKUTA, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc:
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Class action litigants are increasingly likely to
employ the doctrine of cy pres to settle complex class
actions.1 Until recently, courts in our circuit were
well-positioned to address the issues associated with
this trend because our cy pres jurisprudence was
clear. Under a line of cases beginning with Six (6)
Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904
F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990), we required that a cy pres
award (1) be reasonably certain to benefit the class,
and (2) advance the objectives of the statutes relied
upon in bringing suit. See also Nachshin v. AOL,
LLC, 663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011); Dennis v.
Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012). By
approving a settlement that fails both criteria,
however, the majority in this case creates a
significant loophole in our case law that will confuse
litigants and judges, while endorsing cy pres
settlements that in no way benefit class members. I
therefore respectfully dissent from our unfortunate
failure to rehear this case en banc.
I.
We require district judges to be reasonably certain
that class members will benefit before approving a cy
pres settlement. Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d
at 1308. We have counseled that the “choice of
charity and its relation to the class members and
class claims—or lack thereof—figure[s] heavily in
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and
Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 620 (2010) (discussing
the “dramatic turn in modern class actions toward the use of cy
pres relief”).
1
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our analysis.” Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865 (emphasis
added). Thus, we have rejected settlements where
the selected charity lacks “a substantial record of
service” in remedying the types of wrongs alleged, or
where the selected charity is not sufficiently “limited
in its choice of projects” to ensure that class
members will truly be benefitted by its works. Id.
(quoting Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308).
The majority, however, failed to apply these
safeguards.
First, the selected cy pres beneficiary, the Digital
Trust Foundation (DTF), has no record of service.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir.
2012). The “charity” is simply a bespoke creation of
this settlement. The majority is apparently
untroubled by this. It attempts to distinguish our
case law emphasizing the importance of a charity's
record of service by noting that in those cases “there
was no way of knowing whether the organization
would use the funds to the benefit of class members,”
while here “the settlement agreement and DTF's
Articles of Incorporation tell us exactly how funds
will be used.” Lane, 696 F.3d at 822. Respectfully,
they do no such thing.
The DTF has made a written commitment to “fund
and sponsor programs designed to educate users,
regulators[,] and enterprises regarding critical issues
relating to protection of identity and personal
information online through user control, and the
protection of users from online threats.” Id. However
one might describe this mission statement, “limited”
is not the word that comes to mind. See, e.g., Dennis,
697 F.3d at 865. DTF promises to fund and sponsor
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“programs” that address “critical issues” relating to
Internet privacy. But neither the “programs” nor the
“issues” are defined with any specificity, and
certainly not the specificity necessary to be
reasonably certain that class members will actually
benefit from these activities.
Frequent NPR listeners know that the MacArthur
Foundation's
open-ended
mission
statement
indicates that it is “committed to building a more
just, verdant, and peaceful world.” MacArthur
Foundation, http://www.macfound.org/about (last
visited February 18, 2013). But that is no guarantee
that a donation to the MacArthur Foundation will
actually result in, or advance, justice, verdancy, or
peace. Rather, a potential donor must look to other
factors, such as the MacArthur Foundation’s past
record of service or its specific list of projects, to
determine whether it is reasonably certain that a
donation will truly bring about the promised effects.
That the DTF is committed to funding “programs”
regarding “critical issues” says absolutely nothing
about whether class members will truly benefit from
this settlement; it simply promises that DTF will do
some “stuff” regarding some more “critical stuff.” If
fashioning an open-ended, one-sentence mission
statement is all it takes to earn cy pres settlement
approval in our court, we have completely
eviscerated the meaning of our previously controlling
case law.
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II.
The majority also undercuts our precedent requiring
cy pres money to be spent in a manner that advances
the “objectives of the underlying statutes.” Nachshin,
663 F.3d at 1036. But DTF’s receipt of these
settlement funds, even if unobjectionable in all other
respects, simply does not advance the objectives of
the statutes upon which plaintiffs relied in their
suit.
Here, the plaintiffs brought claims under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1030; the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2710; the California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750; and the
California Computer Crime Law, Cal. Penal Code
§ 502. With the exception of the California Consumer
Legal Remedies Act, these statutes all share a
common purpose—preventing the unauthorized
access or disclosure of private information. Yet the
DTF's sole stated purpose is to “educate users,
regulators[,] and enterprises” on how to protect
Internet privacy “through user control.” Lane, 696
F.3d at 822 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ claims,
however, have nothing to do with users’ lack of
“education” or “control.” Instead, they relate to
misconduct by Internet companies that wrongfully
exposes private information in ways that even
educated users cannot anticipate, prevent, or direct.
Our precedent holds that it is not enough simply to
identify any link between the class claims and a cy
pres distribution, such as whether both concern food
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(Dennis) or the Internet (Lane). Instead, an
appropriate cy pres recipient must be dedicated to
protecting consumers from the precise wrongful
conduct about which plaintiffs complain. See Dennis,
697 F.3d at 867. But an organization that focuses on
protecting privacy solely through “user control” can
never prevent unauthorized access or disclosure of
private information where the alleged wrongdoer
already has unfettered access to a user’s records.
The DTF can teach Facebook users how to create
strong passwords, tinker with their privacy settings,
and generally be more cautious online, but it can't
teach users how to protect themselves from
Facebook’s deliberate misconduct. Unless of course
the DTF teaches Facebook users not to use
Facebook. That seems unlikely.
I regret the muddle this case makes of our cy pres
jurisprudence, and I respectfully dissent from our
failure to rehear this case en banc.

